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Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial
Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth
Amendment
Laura I. Appleman*
Abstract
In a criminal system that tips heavily to the side of wealth
and power, we routinely detain the accused in often horrifying
conditions, confined in jails while still maintaining the
presumption of innocence. Here, in the rotting jail cells of
impoverished defendants, lies the Shadowlands of Justice, where
the lack of criminal procedure has produced a darkness unrelieved
by much scrutiny or concern on the part of the law.
This Article contends that our current system of pretrial
detention lies in shambles, routinely incarcerating the accused in
horrifying conditions often far worse than those of convicted
offenders in prisons. Due to these punitive conditions of
incarceration, pretrial detainees appear to have a cognizable claim
for the denial of their Sixth Amendment jury trial right, which, at
its broadest, forbids punishment for any crime unless a crosssection of the offender’s community adjudicates his crime and
finds him guilty. This Article argues that the spirit of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right might apply to many pretrial
detainees, due to both the punishment-like conditions of their
incarceration and the unfair procedures surrounding bail grants,
denials and revocations. In so arguing, I expose some of the worst
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University, B.A., M.A., English, University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to W.
David Ball, Shima Baradaran, Doug Berman, Stephanos Bibas, Jack Chin,
Caroline Davidson, Cara Drinian, Roger Fairfax, David Friedman, Carissa
Hessick, Arnold Loewy, Dan Markel, Caren Morrison, Judith Resnik, Giovanna
Shay, Anne Traum, Rose Villazor, Norman Williams, and the participants at the
2011 ABA Fourth Annual Sentencing & Reentry Institute and Legal Educators
Colloquium and 2012 Southwest Criminal Law Conference for comments on
earlier drafts. Thanks also to Willamette for research support.
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abuses of current procedures surrounding bail and jail in both
federal and state systems. Additionally, I propose some much
needed reforms in the pretrial release world, including better
oversight of the surety bond system, reducing prison overcrowding
by increasing electronic bail surveillance, and revising the bail
hearing procedure to permit a community “bail jury” to help
decide the defendant’s danger to the community.
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I. Introduction: Diplomats, Detention, and Punishment
Notwithstanding crime, the decision to imprison a defendant
before trial all too often hinges on wealth and power. For
example, a promiscuous foreign diplomat is halted at the airport,
ready to flee the country, after allegedly sexually assaulting a
hotel chambermaid, and initially denied bail, but then is
permitted to reside in a posh penthouse while electronically
monitored, serving an extremely upscale version of “house
arrest.”1 A lifestyle maven charged with perpetuating insider
trading pleads not guilty and is released without bail, along with
her stockbroker.2 A well-known money manager, accused of
1. James Barron, Strauss-Kahn Is Released from Jail, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2011, at A6.
2. Richard Esposito, Betsy Stark & Ramona Schindelheim, Martha

1300

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297 (2012)

running a $50 billion Ponzi scheme, is permitted basic freedom of
movement within several states while awaiting trial, even after
confessing to the crime and failing to live up to his original $10
million bail terms.3 A prominent governor is charged with serious
corruption and is not only released on minimal bail,4 but is even
allowed to take part in a Donald Trump reality show while
charges are still pending.5 A wealthy couple charged with
enslaving and brutally mistreating two young maids—including
starving, beating, and torturing—are permitted pretrial release6
with electronic monitoring, due in part to their ability to afford a
specialized security firm that functions as private bail guards for
the very wealthy.7 And a well-known alleged Mafia boss, charged
with various racketeering charges (and suspected of inducing a
variety of violent crimes as acting boss), is released on a $10
million bail, an oath to wear an electronic bracelet, and a guard
at his Oyster Bay, Long Island mansion.8

Stewart Pleads Not Guilty, Resigns, ABC NEWS, June 4, 2003, http://abc
news.go.com/Business/story?id=86245&page=1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Alex Berenson, Authorities Ease Madoff’s Bail Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2008, at B1.
4. Blagojevich Free on $4500 Bail After Arrest, CNN, Dec. 9, 2008,
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-12-09/politics/illinois.governor_1_76-page-affidavitsenate-seat-rod-blagojevich?_s=PM:POLITICS (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. Emily Miller, Rod Blagojevich Will Star on ‘Celebrity Apprentice’
DAILY,
Jan.
5,
2010,
Despite
Prosecutors’
Concerns,
POLITICS
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/01/05/rod-blagojevich-scheduled-for-celebrityapprentice-despite-pro/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
6. Amrita Rajan, Long Island Indian Couple in Slavery Case Get Bail,
DESICRITICS.ORG, May 31, 2007, http://desicritics.org/2007/05/31/135057.php
(last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. Alan Feuer, Bail Sitters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at MB1. These
kinds of “bail sitting” jobs often require bullet-proof vests, electronic ankle
bracelet monitoring, and “the deployment of a chase car, a digital voice recorder,
a broadband wireless router, several metal door bars and a high-resolution,
vandal-resistant Nuvico day/night camera—the one with the plastic dome and
manual zoom lens.” Id.
8. Joseph Berger, John Gotti’s Son Is Freed on Bail of Ten Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/02/nyregion/john-gotti-sson-is-freed-on-bail-of-10-million.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited
Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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In contrast, a New Jersey barber is pulled over and arrested
for a backlog of unpaid parking tickets and failing to register his
new car. After his arrest, unable to make his $1000 bail, he is
sent to serve his pretrial detention at a local halfway house,
where he is robbed and murdered by three inmates for the three
dollars in his pockets.9 His predicament is all too common. The
average defendant in pretrial detention has either committed a
minor crime and cannot afford to pay the set amount of bail, or
has somehow triggered a preventative detention hold—despite
the fact that the science of predicting dangerousness can be
dubious. Incarcerated, this impoverished defendant has little
ability to contact an attorney or plan a defense. And this
impoverished defendant is captive to a justice system that
regularly allows commercial bail bondsmen to lobby against
pretrial release based on inexpensive electronic monitoring,
simply to increase their profits.
Although most convicted offenders are incarcerated at state
or federal prisons, detainees are typically housed in local or
municipal jails where “resources are scarcer, the staff is ‘less
professionalized,’ classification of inmates is haphazard, and
rapid turnover makes for generally chaotic conditions.”10 Once
the average, nonprivileged, indicted defendant is detained, he is
subject to all sorts of punitive conditions, as the state of many
halfway houses and metropolitan and rural jails are truly
reprehensible, even when measured against prisons. Frequently,
these detention centers are vastly overcrowded. Abuse and even
murder of pretrial detainees, either by guards or other
prisoners, is endemic. Various infections and serious illnesses
all too often rage unabated in local and county jails, with
minimal health services provided because of the transient
nature of the population. Often, not only are the jails
themselves older and decaying,11 but they also have various
9. Sam Dolnick, At Penal House, Volatile Mix Fuels a Murder, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2012, at A1.
10. David Gorlin, Note, Evaluating Punishment in Purgatory: The Need to
Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-Confinement Claims from Inadequate
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417, 419 (2009).
11. See AMANDA PETTERUTI & NASTASSIA WALSH, J USTICE POLICY
I NSTITUTE, JAILING COMMUNITIES: THE IMPACT OF JAIL EXPANSION AND EFFECTIVE
PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 15 (2008) (citing studies from the 1990s that show
that 700 jails in the United States are older than fifty years old and 140 jails are
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dangers associated with them, including mold, poor ventilation,
lead pipes, and asbestos.12
In a criminal system that tips heavily to the side of wealth
and power, routinely detaining the accused in often horrifying
conditions, justice is frequently nowhere to be found. Here, in the
rotting jail cells of impoverished defendants—still innocent before
proven guilty—are the Shadowlands of Justice: the murky
corners of the criminal justice system, where the lack of criminal
procedure has produced a darkness unrelieved by much scrutiny
or concern on the part of the law.
Our current framework of constitutional criminal procedure
has primarily focused on the treatment of offenders once the trial
or plea proceeding has begun and, to a lesser extent, once these
offenders have been convicted and sent to prison. But until very
recently, little attention has been paid to the plight of those
pretrial defendants languishing in the intermediate world of jails.
In part, this is due to the classification of a pretrial offender’s
treatment as “detention,” as opposed to “punishment.” As I will
argue, however, the conditions of most pretrial detention differ
little from punitive incarceration, subjecting these offenders to
the worst of conditions without even a guilty verdict.
As such, these pretrial detainees would appear to have a
cognizable claim for the denial of their Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, which, at its broadest, forbids punishment for any
crime unless a cross-section of the offender’s community
adjudicates his crime and finds him guilty. This Article explores
how the animating principles of the Sixth Amendment
community jury trial right would apply to defendants who are
held under pretrial detention. In doing so, I look specifically at
the procedures surrounding indicted offenders who are denied
bail and confined in jail.
In Blakely v. Washington,13 the Supreme Court clarified that
a jury must determine any imposition of punishment.14 The
more than 100 years old).
12. Id.
13. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (holding that a
state trial court’s sentence of more than three years above the statutory
maximum “did not comply with the Sixth Amendment”).
14. See id. at 304 (“When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict
alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes
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realities of bail and jail in today’s criminal justice system,
however, dictate that punishment is often imposed by nonjury,
nonjudicial, and occasionally, private actors, such as bail
bondsmen, probation officers, and correction officials. In other
words, conditions tantamount to punishment are imposed, far
from the oversight imagined by the Framers of the Constitution,
and violating the true spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right.
Although bail and detention was a popular scholarly topic a
generation ago, only a few contemporary legal academics have
scrutinized the current machinations of pretrial release,15 with
existing scholarship primarily focusing on Fourth, Fifth, or
Eighth Amendment violations. None, however, have analyzed the
results of the changes in pretrial release standards and the
increasing relevance of the Sixth Amendment. This Article aims
to fill that gap by studying the problems of our current pretrial
detention system through a Sixth Amendment lens.
I contend that the spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right might apply to many pretrial detainees, due to both the
punishment-like conditions of their incarceration and the unfair
procedures surrounding bail grants, denials, and revocations. In
doing so, I also expose some of the worst abuses of current
procedures surrounding bail and jail in both federal and state
systems.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II of this Article
exposes the often intolerable and primitive conditions of state and
local jails, which end up punishing all those incarcerated in them,
whether convicted or not. Part III traces the history of pretrial
detention, focusing as well on the resurgence of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right. Part IV explores how pretrial
confinement has become a kind of punishment imposed
inconsistently, by fluctuating actors, and without proper
predictive basis. This part focuses on both the failures of the 1984
Bail Reform Act as well as the complete lack of predictability that
essential to punishment.’”).
15. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90
TEX. L. R EV. 497, 499–556; Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of
Innocence, 72 OHIO ST . L.J. 723, 724–76 (2011); Marc Miller & Martin
Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 344
(1990).
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the current dangerousness formula possesses. Part IV also
discusses how the current system of bail and jail entirely
bypasses the community role in both imposing punishment and
creating a safer living area. Finally, Part V introduces some
much needed reforms in the pretrial release world, including
reforming the surety bond system, reducing prison overcrowding
by increasing electronic bail surveillance, and revising the bail
hearing procedure to permit a community “bail jury” to help
decide the defendant’s danger to the community.
Only recently has the national and local media shined a
spotlight on both bail and jail procedures and their conditions
and failures, exposing a dark corner of the criminal justice
system where procedural fairness and due process are limited
and sometimes nonexistent. This Article hopes to add a scholarly
dimension to these troubling exposés, illustrating how pretrial
detention violates the spirit of the Sixth Amendment and creates
a Shadowlands within criminal justice.
II. Pretrial Detention as Punishment
Pretrial detention in the twenty-first century has evolved
from a brief containment for a few accused deemed exceptionally
dangerous to punishment for large numbers of accused awaiting
trial. The combination of inhumane and degrading conditions, a
corrupt and unregulated system of bail surety, bail bondsmen,
and bounty hunters, and rising numbers of detainees, with the
general absence of criminal due process in the pretrial realm, has
resulted in a criminal justice system that punishes before it
convicts. This contradicts the requirements of even our minimal
pretrial protection for defendants, which holds that punishment
can only occur after a conviction.16 Punishing the accused before
she is proven guilty violates every theory of punishment, but
particularly retributive justice, which requires that punishment
can only be imposed after a cross-section of the community has
pronounced guilt—a far cry from the pretrial detention system we
have now. Although the abuses of pretrial detention are
16. See Bell v. Wolfish, 447 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979) (holding that due
process requires that pretrial detainees be free from “punishment”).
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beginning to garner media attention, only a little scholarly
attention has been paid.17 It is time to remedy this oversight.
A. Bail Bondsmen, Bounty Hunters, and Corrupt Incentives
Our current bail system is by-and-large unregulated and
plagued with corruption. First, numerous offenders languish in
local jails for weeks for committing mere misdemeanors, simply
because they lack the funds to post bail.18 In New York City, for
example, most of these charges are for minor quality-of-life
offenses, such as smoking marijuana in public, jumping a subway
turnstile, or shoplifting, and bail was set at $1,000 or less.19 Yet,
the overwhelming majority of defendants are unable to muster
funds and are sent to jail, where they remain, “on average, for
more than two weeks.”20 In a 2010 study, eighty-seven percent of
the low-income defendants who were not released on their own
recognizance were unable to post bail and went to jail to await
guilty pleas or trial.21
What is even more disturbing is that many of the poorer
defendants may have pled guilty at arraignment for sentences
with no jail time, simply to avoid being behind bars while
awaiting trial.22 Impoverished defendants will often accept a
guilty plea, even if innocent, in order to gain release from pretrial
detention, even if this injures their long-term prospects.23

15.

17.

See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 15; Baradaran, supra note

18. Mosi Secret, N.Y.C. Misdemeanor Defendants Lack Bail Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at A27.
19. Id.
20. See id. (finding that 87% of defendants whose bail was set at $1,000 or
less did not post bail).
21. HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION OF NONFELONY LOW-INCOME DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2010),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_
0.pdf.
22. See id. at 2–3 (“Most persons accused of low level offenses when faced
with a bail amount they cannot make will accept a guilty plea; if they do not
plea at arraignment, they will do so after having been in detention a week or
two.”).
23. Laura Sullivan, Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed with Inmates,
NPR, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.npr.org/2010/01/21/122725771/Bail-Burden-
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Inability to muster the appropriate funds for bail is not just a
problem for misdemeanor felony defendants. Judges often set
money bail at an amount the defendant cannot afford. In New
York, for example, only ten percent of defendants in all criminal
cases in which bail is set are able to post it at arraignment.24 This
is despite the fact that many states have laws that establish a
preference for nonfinancial conditions of release or unsecured
bonds.25
The existence of commercial surety bonds, or secured bonds,
does not help low-income defendants. Commercial bondsmen
rarely lend bail money of $1,000 or less, and their services are
usually too expensive for low-income or indigent offenders.26
Likewise, secured bonds are often not accessible for poor
defendants, who usually do not have the property available to
secure such bonds, or friends with such assets.27 Under one
bondsman’s system, to obtain bail for even a minor felony or
misdemeanor charge an indicted defendant must pay cash out of
pocket, sign a twenty-page contract, and initial eighty-six
separate paragraphs.28
If a defendant is fortunate enough to even qualify for secured
bonds, then she must face the web of complex and innumerable
fees charged for simple regulation. For example, in New York, a
bondsman often charges the defendant a fee of $250 if the
defendant misses a weekly check-in, and as much as $375 per
Keeps-U-S-Jails-Stuffed-With-Inmates (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See H UMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, supra note 21, at 4.
25. See id. The federal government and the District of Columbia prohibit
courts from imposing money bail that defendants cannot meet and which
therefore results in their pretrial detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006).
26. See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL J USTICE AGENCY, MAKING BAIL
IN NEW YORK CITY: COMMERCIAL BONDS AND CASH BAIL 6 (2010) (interviewing
fourteen detainees with low bail amounts who were turned down by the
bondsman). Bond agents typically charge a 10% fee for the first $3,000, 8% for
the next $7,000, and 6% for amounts over $10,000. The fee is not refunded.
Bondsmen also require collateral, typically cash, which is refunded unless bail is
forfeited for failure to appear. See id. at 3.
27. In New York, for example, criminal procedure law authorizes the use of
secured bail bonds secured by personal and real property; the surety may be
provided by the defendant himself or someone other than the defendant.
28. John Eligon, For Poor, Bail System Can Be an Obstacle to Freedom,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A15 [hereinafter Eligon, Bail System].
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hour for obscure tasks like bail consulting and research.29 These
specified fees can grow much greater when bail bondsmen are
assigned to other tasks, such as obtaining court documents or
delivering release papers to jail.30
Even if an indicted defendant can afford a commercial surety
bond, these commercial bonds are almost entirely unregulated
and often corrupt. At the frontiers of criminal justice, bail
bondsmen hold an immense amount of power over the bailees,
despite the bondsmen’s lack of legal, political, or police authority.
Far from having a jury or a judge decide whether an indicted
defendant should be incarcerated and punished, these bail
bondsmen make such decisions in a completely unstructured
universe, where they are both judge and jury. This kind of
unauthorized decision-making surely violates the spirit of the
Sixth Amendment, which at its very core requires legal conviction
before punishment.
More troubling are the vast amounts, sometimes thousands
of dollars, that a bail bondsman may charge if he makes the
decision to revoke bail and return the defendant to jail.31 These
decisions, made entirely on the bondsman’s own accord, with no
regulation from any judicial, police, or legal authority, end up not
only returning the defendant to jail but also costing him and his
family a large percentage of the deposited bond, which is forfeited
when the defendant is surrendered on the sole decision of the
bondsman.
There are few state laws regulating when it is permissible for
a bondsman to surrender a defendant, which leaves the bail
system open to manipulation. New York bondsmen, among
others, have been returning defendants to jail for questionable or
unspecified reasons, and then withholding thousands of dollars to
which the bondsmen may not be entitled.32
Because most state laws allow bondsmen to enter into
private contracts with the people they bail out, it is hard for
judges to regulate their behavior. And even in states that afford
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. (noting that one bondsman returned eighty-nine bailees over a
four-month period and pocketed 15% of the bail when doing so).
32. See id.
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some regulatory supervision, judges rarely take advantage of it.
For example, in New York, although state law allows judicial
consideration of the bondsman’s background, character, and
reputation when deciding whether to accept a bond, a judge
rarely denies bond because of improper behavior.33
Instead of helping defendants stay out of jail, some bail
bondsmen take advantage of the situation and disadvantage
defendants to an even further degree.34 In other words, as
described by a New York attorney familiar with these sorts of
abuses, an indicted offender “can be ordered imprisoned by a
court based solely on the unsworn, untested word of a non-lawenforcement civilian, a civilian who stands to profit financially if
the defendant is incarcerated.”35 This type of entirely
unregulated, potentially improper bond revocation, requiring the
defendant to return to jail on the whims of a private actor, is yet
another example of how the world of pretrial detention operates
at the fringes of justice.
If bailees fail to appear for their hearings, the bondsman
owes the entire bail amount to the court.36 This kind of financial
liability has led to many bondsmen employing recovery agents,
usually known as bounty hunters, to ensure that these indicted
defendants appear for their court dates.37 The last time the
Supreme Court addressed the role of bounty hunters and
bondsmen—one hundred and fifty years ago38—it acknowledged
the historical common law privileges of both bondsmen and
bounty hunters, holding that the right to apprehend a fleeing
defendant originates from the contract relationship between
bondsmen and their clients.39 Despite vast changes in both

33. See John Eligon, New York Is Owed More than 2 Million Dollars in
Delinquent Forfeitures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A18.
34. See Eligon, Bail System, supra note 28 (recounting abuses of N.Y.C. bail
bondsmen that have been investigated by the New York State Insurance
Department).
35. Id.
36. See Stephen N. Freeland, Note, The Invisible Badge: Why Bounty
Hunters Should Be Regarded as State Actors Under the Symbiotic Relationship
Test, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 201, 207 (2010).
37. See id.
38. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872).
39. See id. at 370–71. The Taylor Court noted that bounty hunters could
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criminal law and procedure, however, the Court has not
addressed the topic since.
Bounty hunters do have a few regulations on their behavior,
mostly codified in state law, though they vary widely from state
to state.40 Despite persistent effort, however, attempts to control
bounty hunters through federal legislation have failed.41 As
should not be surprising in such a “wild west,” behavior of some
bounty hunters can be reprehensible. Beyond the showy brutality
spotlighted in such reality shows as “Dog the Bounty Hunter,”42
the rules and prohibitions that constrain the police do not
generally apply to bounty hunters.43 As a result, misconduct often
occurs as bounty hunters take advantage of their legal
privileges.44
Bounty hunters look and act like police, but lack the
screening and training that law enforcement provides its
“seize [delinquent defendants] at any time, detain them until trial, pursue them
across state lines, and even break into their homes if necessary.” Id. at 371.
Some scholars, however, have argued that this statement by the Taylor Court is
only dicta, and not binding on modern-day courts. See, e.g., Todd Barsumian,
Note, Bail Bondsmen and Bounty Hunters: Re-Examining the Right to
Recapture, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 877, 887–88 (1999) (citing Landry v. A-Able
Bonding, Inc., No. 1:92-CV-0257, 1994 WL 575480 (E.D. Tex. May 9, 1994), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 75 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1996)).
40. Forty-seven states have some sort of statute regulating bounty hunting.
See Freeland, supra note 36, at 210 n.70. For example, in 1997, Indiana,
Nevada, and North Carolina started licensing bounty hunters, and Texas began
to require warrants for bounty hunters as well as the assistance of licensed
private investigators/security guards. Additionally, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky,
and Oregon have banned commercial bail bond systems, and hence have no
bounty hunters. See id. at 210 nn.66, 70.
41. See id. at 211–12 (noting that two bills that would have made bounty
hunters subject to the same laws and constitutional constraints as police failed
in the House of Representatives).
42. “Dog the Bounty Hunter” is a reality television show on A&E, which
follows Duane Chapman as he hunts down defendants who have missed court
appearances. See DOG THE BOUNTY HUNTER, http://www.dogthebounty
hunter.com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The website for the show proclaims, “Considered the greatest
bounty hunter in the world, Duane ‘Dog’ Chapman has made more than 6,000
captures in his twenty-seven-year career.” Id.
43. See J ACQUELINE P OPE, B OUNTY H UNTERS , MARSHALS , AND S HERIFFS :
FORWARD TO THE PAST 4 (1998) (“Rules of law and conduct under which police
function have no relevance for bounty hunters.”).
44. See Freeland, supra note 36, at 212 (collecting stories of incidents).
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recruits.45 As a result, these recovery agents use dangerous and
sometimes illegal tactics to retrieve defendants, property, or both,
including confrontations at gunpoint, forced entries into homes
without a search warrant, and the commandeering of vehicles on
public roadways.46 Indeed, in states where they are allowed to
practice, bounty hunters can legally use stun guns, mace, and
firearms while apprehending bailees. As a result, in the process
of “recovering” the bailee, bounty hunters often complicate and
endanger public safety.47 Moreover, although bounty hunters play
a police-like role, there is little constitutional protection against
poor behavior because they are usually not considered state
actors.48
In sum, the unregulated private actors, unsupervised and
unaccountable bail bonding companies, complex and unfair fee
structures, tremendous pressure to plead guilty, overincarceration for minor offenses, and disproportionately high bail
all combine to make our system of pretrial detention a nightmare
to navigate and constitutionally questionable. That this system
disproportionately affects the poor makes our current pretrial
detention system all the more disturbing.
B. Increased Numbers of Poor Indicted Offenders Denied Bail
At any given moment, a large proportion of jail dwellers
consist of felony and nonfelony pretrial detainees who are in jail
because they have not posted bail. Of the nation’s jail population,
60.2% are detainees awaiting trial.49 Nationally, taxpayers spend
$9 billion annually to incarcerate defendants held on bail.50
45. Daniel Stanton, Bondsmen Pose Danger to Public, PORTLAND TRIB., May
12, 2011, http://www.portlandtribune.com/opinion/story.php?story_id=1305148
91339544200 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Freeland, supra note 36, at 228 (discussing the inadequacy of the
logic behind distinguishing police officers and bounty hunters).
49. TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2011—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2011).
50. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, JANUARY–DECEMBER 2011 ANNUAL REPORT
3 (2011).
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The rate of pretrial incarceration (and incarceration in jails
and other nonprison detention places in general) has continued to
rise over the past ten years even though prison growth rates have
been leveling off.51 Indicted offenders are less likely to be released
pretrial.52 This includes not only those who have been indicted for
violent offenses but also those who are awaiting trial for property,
drug, and public-order-related charges.53 Additionally, fewer
indicted offenders are being released from jail on their own
recognizance, and those who have been granted bail are often
unable to afford it.54 These types of high bail requirements make
it very difficult for indicted defendants to obtain pretrial release,
despite the fact that the vast majority of these offenders have
been arrested for low-level, nonviolent offenses.55
Despite this increasing reliance on incarcerating indicted
defendants before trial, communities are not necessarily any
safer. The places with the highest incarceration rates have not
necessarily seen violent crime rates fall.56 In fact, quite to the
contrary, New York City decreased its jail population and
experienced a drastic reduction in crime rates.57
As Human Rights Watch has astutely noted in discussing the
problems with pretrial detentions in New York City:
Time in jail before one has had one’s day in court is
particularly troubling for the one in five detained non-felony
defendants who . . . will not be convicted. It is also
disproportionate in light of sentences typically imposed when
there is a non-felony conviction: data from the New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services, for example, indicates
that eight out of ten convicted misdemeanor arrestees receive
sentences that do not include jail time.58
51. PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. Indeed, as the report notes, three-quarters of those pretrial
detainees charged with property, drug, and public order related charges are
“significantly less likely” to be released. Id.
54. Id. As the report explains: “Once, more than half of those jailed
received bail amounts of $5,000 or less; today, just about half of the people in
jail receive the highest bail amounts ($10,000 to the maximum).” Id.
55. Id.
56. See H UMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, supra note 21, at 4.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 2.
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This is disturbing in regards to the large number of pretrial
detainees who are indicted and held on misdemeanors, as
detailed above. Incarcerating poor defendants for nonfelony
offenses (primarily misdemeanors, but also violations and
infractions)59 is perhaps the most troubling aspect of this trend.
This kind of jailing is “uniquely difficult to reconcile with the
fundamental notions of fairness and equality that should be the
cornerstones of criminal justice.”60 For these cases especially,
pretrial detention is a disproportionate abbreviation of rights,
particularly in light of the nonthreatening, petty nature of most
of the charged nonfelony crimes.61
The increasing rate of pretrial detention is worrying,
however, even for those defendants charged with more serious
crimes, due to the conditions of the actual detention centers
housing pretrial defendants. Although state and federal prisons
are not generally known for their plush accommodations, the
general state of the jails that hold pretrial detainees is so bad
that simply to be incarcerated in them rises to a punitive
experience.
C. The Punishing Conditions of Pretrial Detention
The substandard conditions of today’s pretrial detention
centers—our halfway houses and local and municipal jails—have
transformed the detainee’s experience into a punishing one. It is
a little-known but unfortunate truth that pretrial detainees often
undergo harsher conditions of confinement than those defendants
who are convicted.62 While state and federal prisons house most
convicted prisoners, jails and county lockups house the accused
who have either been denied bail or cannot afford to pay it.
Moreover, pretrial detainees are often incarcerated alongside
the ten percent of convicted criminals who are housed in jails
rather than prisons.63 This indicates that the holding conditions
for pretrial detainees are, at minimum, punishment-like, as it is
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gorlin, supra note 10, at 419.
PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 3.
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precisely the same as that for some convicted offenders. The lines
between prison and jail are becoming increasingly blurred, and
not for the better.64
Historically, determining whether certain conditions rise to
the level of punishment requires objective indicia. Specifically, in
Bell v. Wolfish,65 the Supreme Court held that courts can decide
“‘whether [the detainee’s condition] has historically been
regarded as punishment.’”66 In addition, Youngberg v. Romeo67
held that those forcibly committed to state institutions retain
their substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.68 As
others have noted, the Court’s holding in Youngberg indicates
that, by the same token, criminal pretrial detainees’ arguments
should be analyzed objectively, instead of subjectively.69
There are numerous objective indicia of confinement that rise
to the level of punishment for pretrial detainees. By far the most
concerning—but not isolated—examples come from Rikers Island
in New York, the municipal lockup for pretrial detainees,
immigrants, juveniles, and any prisoner subject to rehearing or
resentencing.70 The jail on Rikers Island has been sued in recent
years by more than a half-dozen Rikers inmates, all claiming to
have been the victims of beatings by prisoners while guards
ignored it, or worse, ordered the attacks.71
64. See id. (noting that criminals are increasingly sent to jail, not prison).
65. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (holding that courts may
decide “‘whether [the detainee’s condition] has historically been regarded as
punishment’”).
66. Id.
67. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that a mentally
handicapped prisoner had “constitutionally protected liberty interests under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions
of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such
minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests”).
68. Id. at 315–16.
69. Gorlin, supra note 10, at 441.
70. See N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRECTION, AN OVERVIEW OF NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION FACILITIES, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/html/
about/facilities_overview.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Rikers Island complex contains nine
separate centers for both sentenced defendants and pretrial detainees, including
an adolescent male unit, detox and mental health, hospital, women and baby
unit, misdemeanor unit, maximum security, extreme protective custody, and
detainees unit. Id.
71. Benjamin Weiser, Lawsuits Suggest Pattern of Rikers Guards Looking
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For example, in 2009, two Rikers guards were accused of
recruiting inmates over a three-month period to assist in
maintaining order in a housing unit for teen boys, including
training the inmates in how to restrain and assault their victims,
as well as deciding where and when attacks would occur.72 The
housing unit was run much like a Mafia organization, in which
two correction officers were the bosses.73 Even more troubling, the
recent pattern of cases involving Rikers guards indicates that the
management of the jail is, if not complicit in the abuses, at least
marginally aware of it.74
The types of punitive violations occurring at Rikers do not
just involve misconduct by guards. For years the jail had a policy
of strip-searching all prisoners, even nonviolent ones charged
with minor crimes, and, over an eight-year period, roughly
100,000 people were strip-searched after being charged with
misdemeanors and taken to Rikers Island and other city
correction facilities.75 A majority of the strip-searched detainees
were charged with trespassing, shoplifting, jumping turnstiles, or
failing to pay child support,76 minor offenses on even a
misdemeanor scale. Considering most federal circuits have
upheld laws banning strip-searches for detainees charged with
minor offenses,77 this course of action violated the pretrial
Other Way, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A21.
72. Id.
73. John Eligon, Correction Officers Accused of Letting Inmates Run Rikers
Island Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A20. As the article explained, “guards
reputedly sent inmates to intimidate, threaten and silence uncooperative
prisoners with brute force. Inmates were ordered to turn over money, and their
every move, including when they could use the bathroom, was controlled. If
word of an assault got out, the guards would allegedly orchestrate a cover-up.”
Id.
74. Weiser, supra note 71.
75. Michael Schmidt, City Reaches $33 Million Settlement over Strip
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A22.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2005)
(noting other cases where officers were required to have reasonable suspicion to
strip search minor offenders); Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1993) (“‘Law
enforcement officers may not strip search an individual for contraband unless
the officers have a reasonable basis to believe at the time of the search that the
individual is concealing contraband on his or her body.’” (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273
(7th Cir. 1983))).
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detainees’ Fourth Amendment rights and created an atmosphere of
fear and punishment.
Jails in other major metropolitan areas are rife with similar
abuses. The Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail is notorious for
overcrowding, forcing inmates to sleep on dirty floors, devoid of
natural light, where inmates get only one two-hour outdoor
recreation session per week on the jail’s roof.78 In Maricopa
County’s Tent City Jail, in Phoenix, Arizona, inmates are housed
outdoors in military tents without air conditioning (despite over
100 degree temperatures in the summers), fed 15-cent meals only
twice a day to cut costs, are forced to wear humiliating prison gear,
and have very few amenities.79 And in Washington, D.C.’s Central
Detention Facility, there is overcrowding, serious health and
sanitation issues (including broken showers, no running water in
cells, and animal feces throughout the facility), and inadequate
healthcare.80 All this is in addition to the abuse that pretrial
detainees can be subjected to in jails, ranging from violent
treatment by other prisoners to more institutionalized practices.
On a somewhat less deadly scale, but still punitive in nature,
are the fees now imposed on poor detainees by many jails. In
Florida, for example, fees are imposed for the use of the public
defender for misdemeanors,81 which tend to include a large section
of pretrial detainees who often cannot afford the fees to make
bail.82 Adding a $50 fee to even consult a public defender83
undoubtedly has a chilling effect on many of these indicted
offenders, who may go without counsel due to an inability to
afford the fee. Moreover, failure to use the public defender can
then lead to a cascade of effects, particularly for driving violations
including court-ordered fees, followed by failure to pay, which can
lead to more fees, more unlicensed driving, and sometimes
incarceration.84 Under Florida and North Carolina law, there are
78. PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 19.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. REBEKAH DILLER, B RENNAN CTR. FOR J USTICE AT THE NEW YORK U NIV .
LAW SCH., THE HIDDEN COST OF FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 4, 6 (2010),
www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/FloridaF%26F.pdf?nocdn=1.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 5–6. Specifically, there is a $50 “application fee.” See id.
84. Id. at 4.
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no exceptions or waivers for the indigent,85 and the waiver is
rarely utilized in Georgia.86
Likewise, in Louisiana, fees for using the public defender are
imposed after the bail hearing.87 All of the criminal courts of
Orleans Parish impose fines and fees regardless of an indicted
defendant’s ability to pay them, and waiver is rarely granted.88
For very poor defendants who often cannot come up with bail
money, the imposition of another fee on top of the bail fee, for
simply consulting the public defender, results in a fee-based
punishment. This is exacerbated by the fact that when
defendants are unable to pay their fines, fees, and costs, they may
be incarcerated—even if they have been found not guilty of their
original crime.89 Once incarcerated, the indigent defendant is
even less likely to be able to pay the fees, which compound,
leading to higher debt and longer incarceration.90 Because they
can only afford to pay small amounts of their incomes to redeem
their fees, many of these men and women can remain caught up
in the criminal justice system for years, and they may find
themselves back in jail when their legal debts become
overwhelming.91
In impoverished states such as Michigan, some pretrial
detainees are assessed a $12 jail entry fee, $60 per day for jail
room and board, and additional reimbursement to the
correctional facility for medical and other services.92 One jail in
Michigan requires the defendant to pay a $12 fee to be released
from jail.93 So for an indigent pretrial detainee who cannot afford
85. Id. at 7.
86. ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTOR PRISONS 62
(2010). Georgia requires a $50 fee from all poor criminal defendants, including
pretrial detainees, who simply request the services of a public defender. See id.
Most of such defendants never get a chance to demonstrate their indigence and
simply waive their right to counsel. See id.
87. Id. at 17. The public defender fee is usually $40. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 18. Late fees of $100 per payment are often imposed. Id.
Defendants may also be sent to jail for fifteen to thirty days for failure to pay.
Id.
91. See id. at 21.
92. See id. at 30.
93. See id. The aforementioned facility is the Saginaw County Jail, which is
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to meet bail, extra costs are imposed, even if the original charges
ultimately are not proven or are dropped.
Similarly, states such as Ohio frequently impose “pay-tostay” programs on pretrial detainees. It took a federal lawsuit to
stop an Ohio municipal jail from requiring detainees to pay a
daily fee for their preconviction jail time.94 A comparable
payment program for pretrial detainees also existed in Georgia
until recently, in which the sheriff of Clinch County routinely
charged pretrial detainees for the costs of room and board well
before conviction.95 In certain cases, the sheriff even forced
detainees to choose between signing a promissory note (to be later
enforced) or being returned to jail.96 This practice only stopped
with the initiation of a federal lawsuit, which settled in 2006.97
These practices, taken together, have done much to
transform pretrial detention into a modern-day debtor’s prison,
and transformed it from a regulatory to a punitive experience.

the “only lockup facility in the county to hold people on initial arrests or those
sentenced to time for a year or less.” SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY
MICHIGAN JAIL, available at http://www.saginawcounty.com/Sheriff/Corrections/
Jail.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
94. See ACLU, supra note 85, at 53. The Hamilton County Jail, in Ohio,
routinely charged its pretrial detainees a “pay to stay” fee until 2002, when the
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found this violated pretrial
detainees’ right to the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process,
because the detainees were not given a predeprivation opportunity to be heard.
See Allen v. Leis, 213 F. Supp. 2d 819, 832 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding jail's policy
of appropriating cash immediately upon pretrial detainee's arrival at jail to
cover “booking fee” violated defendants’ due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
95. ACLU, supra note 86, at 56.
96. Id. at 56–57.
97. See Complaint, Williams v. Clinch County, Ga., 231 F.R.D. 700 (M.D.
Ga. 2004) (No. 7:04cv00124); Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Williams v. Clinch County, Ga., 231 F.R.D. 700 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (No.
7:04cv00124); see also Greg Bluestein, South Georgia County to Repay Inmates
Saddled with ‘Jail Bills’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 8, 2006) available at
http://www.schr.org/node/119 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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D. Pretrial Incarcerative Harm

The offenders who are incarcerated pretrial suffer
unquestionable harm from this detention.98 In general,
incarceration in jail negatively impacts the mental and physical
health, employment, and family and community interactions of
those incarcerated.99 Pretrial incarceration is also particularly
difficult for those indicted offenders who suffer from poor health,
as jails rarely have adequate resources available to treat people
with physical or mental health problems.100 Additionally, the poor
have a much thinner safety net keeping them from homelessness
and abject poverty, and being incarcerated for potential crimes,
even for a short time, can have a devastating effect.101
Moreover, jails can be dangerous and unhealthy
environments, even more so than prisons. First, the jail buildings
themselves are often old and decaying.102 These old buildings can
have various dangers associated with them, including mold, poor
ventilation, lead pipes, and asbestos, all of which can be very
detrimental to the health of pretrial detainees.103 Second, the
concentration of prisoners, wardens, and visitors in a jail make it
a vector of contagious diseases.104 This is in large part because
serious infections and sexually transmitted diseases are highly
concentrated and easily transmitted in jails,105 and the everchanging detainee population means the residents are constantly
in flux.106 For example, the MRSA drug-resistant superbug has
been thriving in jails, with the potential to infect those detainees
who are there even for only a short time.107 Many jails are not
98. See Gorlin, supra note 10, at 419.
99. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 3.
100. Id.
101. See ACLU, supra note 86, at 6.
102. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 15 (citing studies from the
1990s that show that 700 jails in the United States are older than fifty years old
and 140 jails are more than 100 years old).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. For example, HIV, antibiotic-resistant TB, and bacterial infections all
exist at much higher rates in jails than in the general population. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Silja J.A. Talvi, Deadly Staph Infection ‘Superbug’ Has a Dangerous
Foothold in U.S. Jails, ALTERNET.COM (Dec. 4, 2007), available at
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properly equipped to treat serious health problems in their
detainees, and what healthcare is available is hard to provide to
jails’ often short-term visitors.108
Drug and alcohol addiction and mental illness are an equally
large problem in jails. There is minimal, if any, drug treatment,
although as many as half or more of those arrested and detained
have had issues with drug addiction, alcohol addiction, or both.109
And ever since the wave of deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill
thirty years ago, a large number of the jails’ residents are
mentally unstable.110
This is troubling for a number of reasons. First,
incarceration—even short-term incarceration such as pretrial
detention—tends to further traumatize people with mental
illness, making them more at risk of harming themselves or
others.111 This is particularly true in regards to suicide, which is
the second-highest reason for death after illness in jails.112 These
high suicide rates are closely linked with untreated depression,
all too common in all correctional facilities.113 To further
complicate the situation, many jails lack the institutional mental
health resources required to serve the needs of their detainees.114
Pretrial detention also exerts a burden on an indicted
offender’s family. Children of indicted offenders often end up in
foster care or are otherwise taken away from their families and

http://www.alternet.org/story/69576 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (detailing how
Superbug spreads all too easily in jails because of problems like poorly
ventilated living and sleeping quarters; overcrowded rooms; shared mattresses,
toilets, and showers; and a preponderance of people who arrive with poor health,
drug problems, and severely compromised immune systems) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 15.
109. Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American Style, 3 HARV. L. &
POL ’Y REV. 237, 245 (2009).
110. PERERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 3.
111. See MAEGHAN GILMORE & MARY-KATHLEEN GUERRA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, CRISIS CARE SERVICES FOR COUNTIES 1 (2010) (noting
the detrimental effects of detention on juveniles with mental health disorders).
112. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 16 (finding that the suicide
rate in jails is 42 per 100,000 compared to 11 per 100,000 for the general
population).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 15.
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are far more likely to fall into poverty.115 Family members of the
person in jail experience not only emotional and economic
hardships, but some have also reported experiencing physical
ailments and declining health.116 In Michigan, courts have gone
so far as to incarcerate a mother for being unable to pay for her
child’s incarceration costs, locking her up without even any crime
charged.117
Pretrial detention also augments the possibility of
conviction.118 Incarcerated defendants before trial are more likely
to be found or plead guilty and serve prison time than those
released pretrial.119 The mere possibility of pretrial imprisonment
often compels defendants to plead guilty and give up their right
to trial.120 The prospect of being incarcerated, even for a short
time, can look ruinous to poor defendants, as this often means the
loss of their livelihood, severe disruptions to their family lives, or
both. Accordingly, when confronted with an unaffordable bail, a
large number of pretrial detainees simply plead guilty.121 This
rush to a guilty plea is often exacerbated by the application fee to
use a public defender in some states, as detailed above.122
Finally, pretrial detention can, in some cases, be literally
deadly. Privatization of jails, prisons and halfway houses in
states such as New Jersey have resulted in the housing of violent

115. Dolovich, supra note 109, at 247.
116. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 18 (finding that 48% of those
related to a person in jail experienced declining health after the person was
jailed and 27% reported that their children’s health had dropped).
117. ACLU, supra note 86, at 35. The mother in question was also charged a
room-and-board fee, a drug test fee, and a booking fee for her imprisonment in
the jail. Id. at 35–36.
118. HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, supra note 21, at 2.
119. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 15, at 555. As the authors
expound, “Detention leads to the loss of employment and other negative
financial conditions, less likelihood to obtain private counsel, which harms
defendant’s chances to be acquitted or at sentencing.” Id.
120. HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH supra note 21, at 3; see also Baradaran &
McIntyre, supra note 15, at 555 (“[L]iving conditions in jail are often poor and
have been shown to have a negative influence on defendant’s trial demeanor.”).
121. HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, supra note 21, at 3. For example, guilty pleas
account for 99.6% of all convictions of New York City misdemeanor defendants.
Id.
122. See supra Part II.C.
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convicted offenders with nonviolent pretrial detainees.123 More
than once, this mixture of low-level detainees with dangerous
convicted felons has resulted in injury or death for those who
cannot make bail for misdemeanor charges.124
All of these practices are transforming our imposition of
pretrial detention from its original incarnation as brief
confinement based on risk of flight to punitive incarceration
decided by a fragmented and inconsistent variety of private and
public actors. This creates two major problems: not only do our
procedures for imposing jail and denying bail disproportionately
affect the poor and disenfranchised, but, as I contend below, they
also violate the spirit of the Sixth Amendment. Taken together,
these practices have created a Shadowlands where the normal
promises of substantive and procedural criminal justice do not
apply.
E. Punishment Before Conviction Violates the Spirit of the Sixth
Amendment Jury Trial Right
This prolonged pretrial incarceration feels troubling because
it seems to punish accused offenders before conviction by
members of the community, violating the very spirit of our
criminal justice system. These offenders are considered innocent
at this phase of the criminal process. Any discomfort we feel with
such practices logically stems from the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, which holds that the accused “shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”125 Our
current pretrial detention practices violate the very tenets of the
Sixth Amendment: the accused are incarcerated for lengthy
periods, suffering punitive and dangerous conditions in jails and
county lockups, based on decisions made by unaccountable
private actors, harried magistrates, or line prosecutors.

123. See Dolnick, supra note 9, at A1 (finding that Delaney Hall, a new
Jersey halfway house, housed at least one person accused of murder).
124. See id. (detailing the murder of a man, arrested for unpaid parking
tickets and failure to purchase car insurance, for the three dollars in his pocket).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Punishment, in other words, is being imposed on those not yet
convicted, without the imprimatur of the jury.
Our pretrial detention practices are even more questionable
when contrasted against the Supreme Court’s recent spate of
opinions highlighting the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Specifically, in the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases, the Supreme
Court reinvigorated the Sixth Amendment jury right,
concentrating on the need for the community, as jury, to impose
punishment on those found guilty. By focusing on this basic
idea—a valid conviction requires all aspects of a crime be
determined by a jury—the Court “provided the basis for [its] . . .
decisions interpreting modern criminal statutes and sentencing
procedures.”126 The Court relied heavily on the historical role of
the community as an arbiter of punishment to support its
contention that only the jury could find facts that increased a
convicted offender’s penalty. In holding that a court can sentence
a defendant only on facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt or admitted by the defendant himself,127 the Blakely Court
gave strong support to the idea that the community must have
the final word on criminal punishment. Thus, the basis of the
Court’s new focus on the rights of the jury in criminal
adjudication rested on the importance of the community’s
determination of punishment.
Despite these recent decisions, bail and jail determinations
still take place far from the community and the jury room, taking
place in the barrens of procedural justice. The Court’s focus on
community participation in criminal adjudication was not limited
to criminal trials, as is illustrated in its recent opinion in
Southern Union v. United States,128 holding that a jury must
decide on the imposition of a criminal fine.129 The Court’s refusal
to limit Blakely/Apprendi to jury trials leaves an opening to
integrate the community jury right into the pretrial detention
sphere. If the Supreme Court has focused on the jury as a
126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 200, 230 (2005).
127. See id. at 313 (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the
State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002))).
128. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
129. See id. at 2357 (holding that Apprendi applies to criminal fines).
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representative of the community, as the only appropriate body to
impose punishment on a convicted offender, then how much more
important is it that the community have a say in determining
whether punitive conditions fall upon an unconvicted offender?
The Apprendi-Blakely line of decisions, forbidding imposition of
punishment until the jury has decided guilt or innocence, must
inform our practices governing pretrial detention.
Imposing our bail and jail procedures upon pretrial detainees
results in the imposition of unjustified punishment, taking place
virtually unnoticed and unremedied. As such, the spirit of the
Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence should
also apply to pretrial detention in a variety of circumstances.
Whenever detention turns from regulatory to punitive, the
community must have a say in the punishment imposed.
Looking back at both our constitutional and historical
understanding of bail, it is difficult to understand how we got
here, routinely meting out punishment to an accused not yet
convicted of a crime. Our historical bail practices differed greatly
from the complicated and often bewildering array of rules that
govern pretrial detention today. Thus, a thorough understanding
of the history of pretrial detention is critical to fully
comprehending the problems we face today.
III. A Short History of Bailing and Jailing
Although the history of Anglo-American bail procedures has
been well-covered, a brief review of how bail and jail evolved in
this country both before and after the American Revolution will
prove helpful in showing how far we have departed from our
original understanding of both. Since the Supreme Court has
shown a great fidelity to how bail was originally granted in
deciding pretrial detention cases, we should strive to comprehend
the actual working customs during the nation’s earliest days.
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A. Colonial Practices

The practice of bail came over from England with the first
colonists.130 The system of bail developed to free untried
prisoners.131 Like so many of our current criminal procedures, the
bare bones of colonial bail were originally quite simple: the
accused had a friend or neighbor take a pledge, backed by
property, and assume responsibility for him until trial.132 In
determining bail, the judge usually considered such factors as
likelihood of conviction, risk of flight, severity of sentence, and
the character of the accused.133 Many of these provisions were
aimed at limiting judicial discretion in bail decisions, not at
providing liberty for the defendant.134 This is unsurprising,
considering how much criminal justice in the Anglo-American
world was focused on community justice. Early colonial
communities were loath to allow a visiting magistrate to make
any major decisions about one of their own offenders.135
In 1628, the English Petition of Right, thought by many to be
the indirect progenitor of colonial bail law,136 held that bail was to
obtain “the liberty of the subjects”137 from pretrial imprisonment.
130. See W. THOMAS , BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 11 (1976) (“The American
system of bail is derived from practices that originated in medieval England.”).
131. See Betsy K. Wanger, Note, Limiting Preventive Detention Through
Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act,
97 YALE L.J. 320, 323 n.19 (1987). Wagner goes on to note that this system
developed largely because magistrates in medieval England traveled among
different counties, and permitting defendants to be released into the custody of
friends or neighbors as a surety helped avoid their prolonged detention in jail.
Id. Originally the surety had to deliver himself if the defendant absconded;
later, the surety could forfeit money instead of his own person. Id.
132. DANIEL FREED & PATRICIA W ALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES : 1964,
at 1–3 (1964).
133. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery
of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 517
(1983).
134. See Hermine Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO.
L.J. 1140, 1162–63 (1972) (indicating that the purpose of these provisions was
to limit the “admittedly unlimited discretion” of the judges regarding bail to
ensure that noncapital defendants had a right to bail).
135. See id.
136. See Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right
to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 350 (1982).
137. 3 How. St. Tr. 80–224.
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It was this understanding of the right to bail that the colonists
brought with them from the mother country. Excluding capital
cases, defendants were guaranteed release on bail before trial.138
On the American continent, right to bail provisions existed in
several colonial charters and was articulated as early as 1641 in
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties.139 Other colonies such as
Pennsylvania,140 Delaware,141 and New York142 followed suit. Of
138. See Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, supra note 15, at 499 n.1
(citing 2 MATTHEW H ALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289
(1676)).
139. See MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES , art. 18 (1641), available at
http://www.winthropsociety.com/liberties.php. Article 18 provided:
No man's person shall be restrained or imprisoned by any authority
whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced him thereto, if he can put
in sufficient security, bail, or mainprise, for his appearance and good
behavior in the meantime, unless it be in capital crimes, and
contempts in open Court, and in such cases where some express act of
Court doth allow it.
Id.
140. See FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, art. XI (May 5, 1682),
reprinted in 5 T HE FEDERAL AND STATE C ONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS ,
AND OTHER ORGANIC L AWS OF THE S TATES , T ERRITORIES , AND C OLONIES N OW
OR HERETOFORE F ORMING THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , (F RANCIS N.
THORPE, ED., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/pa04.asp. Article XI held that “all
prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses,
where the proof is evident, or the presumption great.” Id.
141. Delaware adopted the Pennsylvania Frame of Government, including
its bail provision, when it became a colony in 1702. Verrilli, supra note 136, at
337.
142. See NEW YORK CHARTER OF LIBERTIES, art. 19 (1683), reprinted in
CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE C ONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK (Rochester
N.Y, 1906), available at http://www.montauk.com/history/seeds/charter.htm.
Article 19 provided:
THAT In all Cases whatsoever Bayle by sufficient Suretyes Shall be
allowed and taken unlesse for treason or felony plainly and specially
Expressed and menconed in the Warrant of Committment provided
Alwayes that nothing herein contained shall Extend to discharge out
of prison upon bayle any person taken in Execucon for debts or
otherwise legally sentenced by the judgment of any of the Courts of
Record within the province.
Id. However, there is some evidence that New York’s right to bail provision was
honored more in the breach than in the execution. Few acknowledged a right to
bail in the eighteenth century. See J. G OEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 502–03 (1944) (finding that neither
defendants nor courts in New York viewed bail as a matter of right).
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course, as many major crimes were still classified as capital
felonies during the colonial era,143 any provisions granting bail in
noncapital cases still excluded numerous defendants.
B. Bail Following the Constitution
Despite these specific discussions of bail in colonial
documents, however, the Framers did not explicitly include a
right to bail in the Constitution, only mentioning it in the context
of the Eighth Amendment.144 Depending on how colonial history
is interpreted, the lack of an explicit right to bail in the
Constitution can be seen either as a historical accident145 or a
deliberate decision.146 There is minimal documentary evidence of
the Framers’ intent to support either position.147 In contrast, the
Judiciary Act of 1789 did specifically provide a right to bail for all
noncapital cases,148 although there is no evidence of any debate
on that provision either.149 The Northwest Ordinance, passed by
143. See TODD R. CLEAR, GEORGE F. C OLE & MICHAEL D. R EISIG, AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS 72–73 (2008) (noting that the Anglican Code in force during the
mid-Eighteenth Century listed thirteen capital offenses). As the authors note,
slightly more than twenty percent of felonies were capital ones in New York. See
id. at 73.
144. The Eighth Amendment provides, among other things, that “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required.” U.S. CONST . amend. VIII.
145. See, e.g., Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 968–69 (1965) (arguing that the failure to include a right to
bail in the Constitution was a historical accident).
146. See, e.g., William F. Duker, Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB.
L. REV. 33 (1977) (arguing that nothing in the colonial history of bail or the
history of the Bill of Rights evidences any intent to have a right to bail).
147. See Verrilli, supra note 136, at 338 n.58. According to the 1788–90
Annals of Congress, the discussion of the bail clause in the Eighth Amendment
was limited to one comment. See id.
148. The Judiciary Act provided, in regards to bail:
[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except
where punishment may be by death, in which cases it shall not be
admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the
supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their
discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstance of the
offense, and of the evidence, the usages of law.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 33 (codified as 1 Stat. 91) (repealed by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141–3151 (1982)).
149. Verrilli, supra note 136, at 338 n.58.
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Congress in 1787, also contained a right to bail.150 On the whole,
then, it is difficult to determine the particular intent of the
Framers in regards to the right to bail.151
Following the ratification of the Constitution, the federal
judiciary made clear that bail was the norm following
indictment,152 due to the presumption of innocence and due
process.153
The right to bail after 1789 also solidified through the vehicle
of state constitutions. Specifically, although only two of the
original colonies—North Carolina and Pennsylvania—retained a
specific right to bail in their state constitutions, every state that
joined the Union after 1789, excluding West Virginia and Hawaii,
included a right to bail.154 This right managed to survive the
“frequent redrafting of state constitutions that occurred during
the nineteenth century.”155 Viewed another way, it was truly in
the state constitutions that the American right to bail reached its
full fruition.156
This fully articulated state right to bail is important for a
variety of reasons. First, most criminal law is state law, not
federal law, despite the scholarly and popular focus on federal
law enforcement.157 Second, bail rights expanded their reach as
150. See Northwest Ordinance § 14, art. 2 (1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
I LLUSTRATIVE OF THE F ORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES
(Charles C. Tansill, ed., Government Printing Office 1927), H.R. DOC. NO. 398,
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp. The bail
provision in Article 2 was identical to the Pennsylvania Frame of Government’s
bail provision, providing that “[a]ll persons shall be bailable, unless for capital
offenses, where the proof shall be evident or the presumption great.” Id.
151. See Verrilli, supra note 136, at 350 (finding that it is impossible to
determine the Founders’ intent by evidence drawn from before 1789).
152. Granted, many felonies during this time were classified as capital
offenses. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (including as capital crimes
treason, murder, piracy, counterfeiting, and robbery on the high seas).
153. See Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835) (holding that bail is not
“designed as satisfaction for the offense, when it is forfeited and paid; but as a
means of compelling the party to submit to the trial and punishment, which the
law ordains for his offense”); see also Taylor v. Tainter, 83 U.S. 366, 371–72
(1872).
154. Verrilli, supra note 136, at 351.
155. Id. at 352.
156. See id. (detailing the history of bail provisions in initial state
constitutions and right-to-bail amendments).
157. This is particularly true with bail, as state and local detention practices
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most state criminal justice codes eliminated many felonies from
the list of capital crimes, generally leaving only murder and
treason.158 Third, the historical right to bail, as articulated by the
states, has only denied bail for reasons involving risk of flight,
rejecting the newer preventative detention theories.159 Finally,
this development shows that the right to bail, although not firmly
rooted in a specific constitutional provision, has been part of the
American criminal justice system since the founding of the
country.
Moreover, how a specific right developed in state statutes has
often been important to the Supreme Court when analyzing the
scope of rights in the federal constitution. For example, in Jones
v. United States,160 the Supreme Court looked at how the states
treated certain aspects of an aggravated crime as either an
element or a sentencing factor in determining whether the reach
of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right required defining serious
bodily harm as an element of federal carjacking, as opposed to a
sentencing factor.161 Similarly, in Duncan v. Louisiana,162 the
Supreme Court used the long history of jury trial rights in state
constitutions to bolster its support for the jury trial right in the
federal constitution.163

“have come to mold and define the operations and limits of the criminal justice
system.” Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 346.
158. See Verrilli, supra note 136, at 352 (noting that the constitutional
amendments giving a right to bail occurred at a time where many states were
pruning the definition of capital crimes to include only murder and treason).
159. Granted, many states have recently amended their constitutions to
allow detention. Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 345.
160. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 236 (1999) (stating that the
court’s finding of serious bodily injury after trial and consequent sentence
enhancement was error since serious bodily injury was an element of the crime).
161. See id. at 236–37 (reviewing how “many States use causation of serious
bodily injury or harm as an element defining a distinct offense of aggravated
robbery”).
162. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all state criminal
cases which would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee if they were
tried in a federal court).
163. Id. at 153 (discussing how every state joining the Union subsequent to
formation had the right to a jury trial articulated in its constitution); see also
Verrilli, supra note 136, at 354.
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Thus the historical right to bail, both as commonly practiced
around the time of the Founding and afterwards in the various
states, has much to teach us about how bail rights today should
be understood and defined, particularly in light of the
preventative detention proposals that are currently fashionable.
C. Recent Bail Reforms
The basic form of bail, relying on the personal surety as the
custodian of the defendant, remained unchanged until the midnineteenth century.164 However, because these bail custodians had
to be both known and acceptable to the courts, the personal surety
system eventually morphed into the commercial bondsman
system.165 This switch “substantially reduced the courts’ ability to
assess the risks of pretrial release,” and—combined with the
decreasing number of nonbailable crimes—added to the general
trend whereby judges set high bails exceeding a defendant’s ability
to pay.166 The imposition of high bail remained the status quo in the
state bail world.
Federal bail remained relatively unchanged from the Judiciary
Act of 1789 until 1966, when Congress passed the first bail reform
act.167 The 1966 Bail Reform Act168 marked a return to conditional
release, and was designed in large part to reduce the high bails
imposed by judges to prevent release of certain defendants.169 The
1966 Bail Reform Act relied heavily on custodial supervision to
ensure proper behavior, requiring judges to consider a variety of
release conditions and release defendants under the most minimal

164. Wanger, supra note 131, at 323–24.
165. See id. (finding that the increased urbanization of American society
made finding a custodian known and acceptable to the court far more difficult).
166. See id.
167. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–3153 (repealed 1983).
168. Id.
169. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON
VIOLENT CRIMES, FINAL REPORT 50–51 (1981), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3187–88) (determining the goals of the 1966 Bail Reform Act were to “cut[]
back on the excessive use of money bonds and provid[e] for flexibility in setting
conditions of release appropriate to the characteristics of individual
defendants”). See generally W. THOMAS , BAIL R EFORM IN AMERICA 164 (1976).
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release strictures possible.170 A major goal of the 1966 Act was to
reduce pretrial flight.171 Pretrial detention based on future
dangerousness was not envisioned.172
The difficulties of successfully implementing the 1966 Bail
Reform Act, such as setting the terms of release and ensuring that
conditions were met, along with worries about the crimes committed
by defendants out on conditional release, led to the passage of the
1984 Bail Reform Act (BRA).173 This federal statute was paralleled
on the state level by no fewer than thirty-four states articulating
specific statutory provisions allowing detention based on a
defendant’s dangerousness, as opposed to a risk of flight.174
The BRA was predicated on protection of the public and
community safety, making this factor one of the most critical in the
determination of whether to release or detain defendants before
trial.175 Most states have followed the path of the BRA, with fortyfive states and the District of Columbia specifically permitting the
determination of dangerousness as a predicate for denying pretrial
release.176
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1966) (allowing release upon conditions such as
personal recognizance; execution of an unsecured appearance bond; third party
custody; travel, association or living restrictions; execution of an appearance
bond; and/or execution of a bail bond).
171. Wanger, supra note 131, at 329.
172. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–3153 (repealed 1983) (failing to consider pretrial
detention based on future dangerousness).
173. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 344 (stating that crime
committed by persons on pretrial release was a major concern for legislators
after the 1966 Bail Reform Act).
174. Id.
175. The Act provides, among other things, that defendants should be
granted bail “unless . . . such release will not reasonably assure the appearance
of the person . . . or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1988).
176. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 15, at 507. As Baradaran and
McIntyre note,
In determining whether the accused is too dangerous to release prior
to conviction, state courts consider three main categories: (1) the
circumstances surrounding the present offense charged, (2) the
defendant’s past conduct, and (3) judicial discretion regarding the
defendant’s circumstances and character. Many states use the first
two categories in an attempt to objectively determine which
defendants pose a risk to public safety.
Id.
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Technically, the 1984 Bail Reform Act reaffirmed the idea
that pretrial release was to continue to be the norm.177 However,
the 1984 Act lacked neutrality regarding the determination of
future dangerousness. For example, the Act contains little to
balance out the reliance on predicting dangerousness for the
defense side. Evidence of other crimes may be presented as
hearsay, which is not subject to cross-examination.178 There is no
notice to defendants that prosecutors may seek pretrial detention
based on prior crimes or behavior.179 Additionally, the 1984 Act
does not require that there be any confrontation between the
defendant and the prosecutor who proffers the evidence.180
Moreover, purporting to be deeply concerned with
“community safety,” the 1984 Bail Reform Act allows federal
prosecutors to request pretrial detention for any felony committed
after two or more convictions of federal or state crimes of
violence.181 The Act contains a rebuttable presumption favoring
detention whenever a defendant has a prior conviction of a
violent crime less than five years prior and was arrested while on
conditional release pending trial for another offense.182 The BRA
grants authority to the courts to confine an indicted individual
based on “the danger a person may pose to others if released.”183
Additionally, under the 1984 BRA, there is no requirement of
evidence of a substantial possibility of the defendant’s guilt.184
And there are no limits on the length of detention beyond the
requirements of the Speedy Trial Act and the vague limits of the
Sixth Amendment. In sum, the requirements for pretrial
detention under the 1984 Act only require a quick hearing with a
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (1988).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988) (providing that the “rules concerning
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and
consideration of information at the hearings”).
179. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 347.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988).
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(E) (1988) (listing requirements for a
request for detention).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2) (1988).
183. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3185.
184. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 348 (stating that Congress
expressly rejected the District of Columbia Act’s requirement of evidence of a
substantial possibility of the defendant’s guilt).
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few limited procedural protections, primarily focusing on whether
the defendant’s prior acts or convictions make it “necessary” to
deny bail for community safety purposes.185
Finally, applying the seven-part test laid out by the Court in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez186 to determine whether an Act of
Congress is penal or regulatory in character proves that the 1984
BRA, as it operates today, is fairly punitive in nature. The
Mendoza-Martinez test has seven distinct questions to determine
the character of a Congressional Act:
[W]hether it involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.187

Applying Mendoza-Martinez to the 1984 BRA illustrates its
largely punitive nature. Five out of its seven factors point to this
conclusion. First, the Act involves an obvious restraint: pretrial
detention. Second, detention has been traditionally regarded as a
punishment in this country,188 so much so that bail was
historically required in all but the most heinous of charged
crimes. Third, pretrial detention cannot promote either
retribution or deterrence, because it is imposed before conviction.
Fourth, the behavior to which the Act applies may be a crime, but
that fact has not yet been determined, by either a jury or a judge.
185. See id. at 349 (detailing the shortcomings of the act).
186. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
187. Id. at 168–69.
188. Two glaring exceptions to this general rule, of course, are the
administrative detentions of immigration holds and continuing civil
incarceration of sex offenders. See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223,
225 (BIA 1990) (characterizing an immigration detainer as “merely an
administrative mechanism to assure that a person subject to confinement will
not be released from custody until the party requesting the detainer has an
opportunity to act”) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 80 n. 2 (1976)); see
also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (holding that the federal
civil-commitment statute authorizes the Department of Justice to detain a
mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner
would otherwise be released).
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On the other hand, the Act applies with no regard to scienter,
just a mere showing of probable cause by the prosecutor. This
disregard for criminal intent points to a more neutral, nonpunitive rationale for the Act. Moreover, it can be argued that
the stated alternative purpose for pretrial detention—
incapacitation—is rational, although tremendously overused.
Overall, however, putting the Act through the seven MendozaMartinez questions shows that it is currently penal in character.
Despite the Act’s flaws, the Supreme Court upheld the 1984
Bail Reform Act against a substantive due process facial
challenge in United States v. Salerno.189 Decided on narrow
grounds, Salerno concluded that the Act was not unconstitutional
in its determinations weighing the defendant’s interest in liberty
against the government’s interest in community safety.190
Rejecting the Southern District of New York’s reasoning that our
criminal justice system can only hold persons accountable for past
actions, not anticipated future ones,191 the Salerno Court found
that merely detaining a person “does not inexorably lead to the
conclusions that the government has imposed punishment.”192
The Salerno Court’s conclusion was based on its belief that the
regulatory goal that Congress sought to achieve in the 1984 BRA
was not punishment, but public safety.193
The Salerno Court carefully noted that it was only looking at
the 1984 Bail Reform Act as created by Congress, not as actually
applied. As such, it reserved the right to decide the point “at
which detention in a particular case might become excessively
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’
regulatory goal.”194 It is possible that by doing so, the Court was
signaling that it would prefer to wait and strike down a
particular detention order when the defendant could show his
interest in liberty outweighed the state’s interest in community
189. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–51 (1987) (upholding the
constitutionality of federal pretrial detention of a defendant in order to protect
the community from danger).
190. See id. at 741 (“We hold that, as against the facial attack mounted by
these respondents, the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements.”).
191. Id. at 745.
192. Id. at 746.
193. Id. at 747.
194. Id. at 747 n.4.
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safety.195 Nonetheless, the Salerno Court’s upholding of the Bail
Reform Act struck a blow to concepts of retributive criminal
justice (the belief that a wrongdoer can only be punished for
crimes he or she has actually committed).
The Salerno Court, however, used some sleight of hand
between the actual language of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and the
way it justified the Act. One of the ways the Court defended the
idea of pretrial detention exclusive of the risk of flight was by
arguing that the government had a legitimate and compelling
interest in preventing crime by arrestees.196
Preventing future crime, though, is a different endeavor than
public safety for the community, the purported reasons behind
the 1984 BRA. Although of course crime prevention does, in a
very general sense, enhance public safety, few crimes are so
dangerous that their very potential requires detention of a
suspect. And the most dangerous of them, murder, is usually
barred from bail release in any case. Nonetheless, the Salerno
Court easily conflated future crime prevention and community
safety into one amorphous concept. Moreover, as other scholars
have noted, the Court evaded the BRA’s underlying problem of
identifying the actual circumstances that transform detention
into punishment.197
Salerno also specifically addressed two constitutional claims
involving the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, quickly dismissing
them both.198 Regarding the Fifth Amendment substantive due
process claim—that pretrial detention constituted impermissible
punishment before trial199—the Court held that because the
195. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 351 (“[T]he Court would
likely prefer instead to wait and declare unconstitutional any particular
detention order in which the defendant could show that the state's interest in
community protection failed to outweigh his or her interest in liberty.”).
196. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748–49 (1987) (stating that
the government may utilize pretrial detention when its regulatory interest in
community safety outweighs an individual’s right to liberty and giving
examples).
197. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 353 (“The Court avoided,
however, the underlying problem of identifying circumstances that make
detention punishment.”).
198. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746, 751–52 (rejecting a facial challenge under
the Fifth and Eighth Amendments).
199. See id. at 746 (summarizing respondents’ argument).
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legislative intent of Congress in the Bail Reform Act was not
punitive, the pretrial detention was not punishment, but
regulation.200
As for the Eighth Amendment claim—that the 1984 Bail
Reform Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause because this clause
grants a defendant the right to bail based solely on the
considerations of flight201—the Salerno Court flatly rejected this
argument, holding that nothing in the text of the Bail Clause
limits bail decisions solely to questions of flight.202 However, the
Salerno Court did not provide any historical evidence to support
this conclusion about the Eighth Amendment, simply leaving the
assertion to stand alone.203 As discussed briefly above,204 although
the specific intent of the Framers regarding bail cannot be
conclusively determined, all the available evidence points to the
fact that pretrial detention, both under English common law and
at the time the Constitution was written, was limited to flight
risks. Thus, the Salerno Court’s rejection of the Eighth
Amendment challenge on this basis is undersupported at best.
Given the changes made to the historical right to bail, our
newfound reliance on preventative incarceration, and the
Supreme Court’s recent focus on the Sixth Amendment’s jury
trial right, our current pretrial detention procedures may require
some substantive changes. In Part IV, I explore the problem with
our current system’s reliance on future dangerousness to
routinely imprison indicted offenders and contend that this
violates our understanding of the role of punishment as dictated
by the Sixth Amendment.

200. Id. at 747.
201. See id. at 752 (summarizing respondents’ argument).
202. Id. at 754.
203. Id. at 753. The Salerno Court did carve out a space to decide later
whether “the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to Congress’ power to define
the classes of criminal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail,” but maintained
the validity of the Bail Reform Act even then. Id. at 754.
204. See supra Part III.B.
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IV. Preventative Detention, Future Dangerousness,
and the Sixth Amendment

There is convincing evidence that modern-day bail and jail
practices result in punishment for the indicted defendant
incarcerated before trial. Although usually the underlying
reasoning for the imposition of pretrial detention is not based on
a punishment rationale, the consequences of such decisions are
often so severe that the end results are punitive.
This punishment before conviction creates numerous
problems for our current bail and jail structure. First, many
offenders are denied bail based on the relatively new field of
preventative detention, which is one riddled with errors, both in
theory and in practice. Second, although Salerno has seemingly
closed off both due process and Eighth Amendment attacks
against the 1984 Bail Act, there have not yet been any challenges
based on the Sixth Amendment ban on punishment imposed
before a conviction and without a jury’s imprimatur. Third, and
relatedly, if we follow the dictates of the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, the community must take part if any punishment is to
be imposed on an offender. Below I explore how these factors—
the mistaken reliance on preventative detention, the holes left by
Salerno, and the requirements of the Sixth Amendment—all
converge to make our current pretrial detention hearings in need
of reform.
A. The False Promise of Preventative Detention
In the federal system, preventative incarceration, or
detaining the accused based on the potential of future crime, did
not become popular until the 1984 Bail Reform Act.205 In the last
twenty years or so, many states have followed suit, allowing their
criminal justice systems to detain the indicted individuals based
on their future dangerousness. Both judges and academics have
challenged the bases for this type of determination, however,
putting the entire theory to question.

205.

18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1988).
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1. Barefoot v. Estelle
One year before Congress passed the 1984 Bail Reform Act,
the Supreme Court discussed a similar issue regarding the
propriety of nonjury actors determining and punishing for future
dangerousness. In Barefoot v. Estelle,206 the Supreme Court
agreed with the lower trial court that the use of psychiatric
experts to discuss the potential dangerousness of the defendant
at trial was permissible because this type of determination was
for the jury to decide: “Such disputes are within the province of
the jury to resolve. Indeed, it is a fundamental premise of our
entire system of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose of the
jury is to sort out the true testimony from the false, the important
matters from the unimportant matters . . . .”207 Put another way,
the majority of the Barefoot Court underlined the importance of
the community’s role in deciding whether a fellow member of the
public is so dangerous as to deserve incarceration on that basis.
This decision, however, focused on the propriety of determining
dangerousness during an actual trial, not during a pretrial
detention hearing.
More important for our purposes, the dissent in Barefoot
highlighted the role of the jury as the proper arbiter of decisions
involving a defendant’s incarceration. Penned by Justice
Marshall, the dissent noted that psychiatrists and other experts
might actually be “less accurate predictors of future violence than
laymen,”208 in part because the lay public lacks a personal bias
leaning towards predicting violence, which can arise from being
responsible for the erroneous release of a violent individual.209 If
this is true for psychiatric experts, it is also likely to be true for
magistrates and trial judges, especially those state court judges
who must submit to the pressures of periodic re-election.
The dissent also focused on a key critique that applies widely
to all determinations of potential future dangerousness: the
206. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903 (1983) (finding that “[e]xpert
testimony, whether in the form of an opinion based on hypothetical questions or
otherwise, is commonly admitted as evidence where it might help the factfinder
do its assigned job”).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 922 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 922 n.4.
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general unreliability of these predictions.210 Citing several
studies, the dissent pointed out that long-term prediction of
future violence by psychiatrists continues to be extremely
inaccurate.211 This is due in part to the difficulty of identifying
any sub-class of offenders who have a greater than fifty-fifty
chance of re-engaging in assaultive conduct,212 the conduct with
which future dangerousness is most concerned. Indeed, a ninety
percent error rate is common.213
All these concerns are focused, of course, on testimony given
to the jury by expert psychiatric witnesses during an actual trial.
How much more unreliable are those hasty predictions by an
untrained magistrate or trial judge, determining future
dangerousness of a person who has not yet been convicted? At the
minimum, the incarceration of an accused individual due to his
potential to commit more crimes should be based on stronger
science than gut feelings or past conduct, and should admit some
aspect of community participation.
2. Preventative Detention’s Binary Nature
The unreliability of accurately determining future
dangerousness, however, is not the only problem with current
imposition of pretrial detention. As other scholars have argued,
our present pretrial detention model is extremely binary, refusing
to account for gray areas.214 Gray areas, however, repeatedly
occur in determining eligibility for pretrial release: “[A] binary
model requires a decision maker to round off the evidence and
210. See id. at 920 (discussing how “‘the unreliability of . . . predictions of
long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the
profession,’” and noting that “two out of three predictions of long-term future
violence made by psychiatrists are wrong” (citing Brief for American Psychiatric
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)
(No. 82–6080))).
211. Id. at 920.
212. Id. (citing Wenk, Robinson & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18
CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 394 (1972)).
213. Id. at 921 n.2.
214. See Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy
Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 327 (1994) (“The prevalence of
pretrial detention is largely a function of our bivalent system of law . . . .”).
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confine the case to total truth or no-truth to make a decision.”215
Accordingly, our current bail system fails to account for the
varying degrees of detainability, dangerousness, and culpability
that indicted offenders present.216
Due to the limitations of the binary model, many of the
judicial determinations that lead to pretrial detention are overly
harsh or punitive.217 This is especially true when it comes to
predicting future dangerousness. Neither experts nor courts have
had much success in accurately determining if and when an
offender might commit more crimes.218 Granted, there have been
some more recent studies that have provided a far better
prediction rate than the older evidence.219 Despite the existence
of such new predictive materials, however, many harmless
defendants are still unfairly detained as dangerous based on old
or outdated beliefs.220
The term dangerous itself can be quite vague when it comes
to detaining pretrial defendants. The 1984 Bail Reform Act failed
to define the term at all.221 Thus the idea of determining
dangerousness to the community is an incredibly broad concept,
which could encompass almost anything, from physical danger to
conspiracy. The problem with this imprecision of terminology is
that accurately determining dangerousness requires a narrow
focus, which the determination of bail so notably lacks.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 327–28.
217. See id. at 327 (criticizing the binary model for its inability to take into
account “partial degrees of truth”).
218. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919–22 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing this problem with the current system); See also Joseph J. Cocozza
& Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1097 (1976) (finding
“dangerous” patients no more so than nondangerous patients); John Monahan,
The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and
Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10 (1984) (arguing that dangerousness predictions
are wrong approximately 95% of the time).
219. See generally Baradaran & McIntyre, Predicting Violence, supra note
15, passim.
220. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON,
DECISIONMAKING IN C RIMINAL J USTICE: T OWARDS THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF
DISCRETION 122–27 (1980) (articulating reasons that predictions of
dangerousness for indicted offenders are often unreliable).
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(g) (2006) (failing to define the term).
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All of this imprecision means that judging future
dangerousness within our current pretrial detention scheme can
be quite arbitrary. Forcing a black or white decision onto a mass
of gray evidence (particularly since it is evidence that has not yet
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt) makes many bail
hearings unreliable and inconsistent.
3. Adjudicating Dangerousness
The problems with determining future dangerousness,
however, do not end there. Even if future dangerousness can be
accurately predicted, should that necessarily mean that
dangerousness should always equal detention and punishment?
Although the question of dangerousness has been widely
discussed in terms of sentencing, the scholarly exploration of the
topic, both procedurally and jurisprudentially, has been rather
limited as applied to pretrial detention. It is this gap that I aim to
fill.
Norval Morris famously addressed using predictions of future
behavior to determine whether a criminal should be imprisoned
after conviction.222 As he noted, “as a matter of justice we should
never take power over the convicted criminal on the basis of
unreliable predictions of his dangerousness.”223 Morris was
concerned that dangerousness was so expansive a concept that
“the punitively minded” would use it to classify all offenders,
deserving or not.224
Moreover, as other scholars have observed, dangerousness is
“peculiarly seductive” because it can be ascribed as a personal
characteristic of the offender, not a judicial imposition.225 And
when dangerousness is seen as a personal trait, it leads to
confusion between the determination of dangerousness and the
determination of desert, when both usually animate the reasons
underlying punishment.226 Likewise, Andrew von Hirsch has
222. See generally NORVAL MORRIS , THE F UTURE OF I MPRISONMENT (1974).
223. Id. at 73.
224. Id. at 72.
225. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Dangerousness and
Criminal Justice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 481, 492 (1986).
226. Id.
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argued that the moral argument against predictive detention “is
that it is not deserved. This objection stands even were the
prediction of future criminality accurate.”227
If all these objections exist for the convicted defendant, how
much more do they resonate for the offender who is only indicted?
In 1968, before the passage of the 1986 Bail Reform Act, the
American Bar Association rejected pretrial preventative
detention, even for “dangerous” offenders, because too little was
known about the actual need for this type of detention and of the
predictive techniques used.228 Although this ship has clearly
sailed, the theoretical issues still remain.
Whether one’s take on desert is animated by limits,
proportionality, or by the parity principle, the theory of desert is
simply inapplicable to pretrial detention because no
determination of crime has yet been made. Predictive
dangerousness, when not based on accurate, up-to-date empirical
evidence, has no place in any rational system of retributive
justice, and yet it is a commonplace determination in American
bail hearings, where it seems least appropriate.
Although the Supreme Court in Salerno rejected both the
procedural229 and substantive230 due process claims, it failed to
discuss the more theoretical problems with judging future
dangerousness. The Salerno Court took for granted that
dangerousness is a fixed term with a fixed meaning, as opposed to
its actual amorphous nature, difficult to chart or pin down. As
such, it is truly inappropriate for use at the pretrial detention
hearing, at which judges have neither the time nor the

227. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, D OING J USTICE: THE C HOICE OF PUNISHMENT
125 (1976). Granted, von Hirsch admits a small fraction of offenders should be
confined by preventative detention, including those who have extensive violent
records and who were convicted of serious assault crimes. Id. at 125–26.
228. See Zimring & Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, supra
note 225, at 496 n.28 (citing ABA Standards Relating to Pretrial Release § 5.5
commentary at 69 (1968)).
229. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that
“the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within
that carefully limited exception”).
230. See id. at 750–51 (rejecting the claim that an individual’s right to
liberty always outweighs the government’s interest in protecting the
community).
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inclination to theorize about how desert might be applied to
offenders who have not yet been convicted.231
This uncertainly and ambiguity of standards in pretrial
detention matters because determining dangerousness is a
central preoccupation of the criminal justice system.232 In part
because of this, the reliability of preventative detention is a hotly
debated topic. As Christopher Slobogin has noted, there is a twopart challenge to the reliability of predictive dangerousness:
(1) persons should not be denied liberty on dangerousness
grounds unless there is a high degree of certainty that the person
will offend in the near future; and (2) this sort of proof of
dangerousness is nearly impossible to obtain.233 Responses to
these concerns have included the charge that even proof beyond a
reasonable doubt has its own unreliabilities as an indicator of
culpability and predictor of future dangerousness.234
For example, the Barefoot Court held that the inconsistencies
inherent in predicting future dangerousness, even in regards to
the death penalty, are largely eradicated by the adversarial
process, which usually exposes erroneous views.235 As the
231. As Dan Markel and Eric Miller noted in an op-ed for the New York
Times, “state and municipal judges, who handle the overwhelming number of
criminal cases, face less public scrutiny than federal judges,” and thus worry
less about the social repercussions of pretrial detention. Dan Markel & Eric
Miller, Op-Ed., Bowling, as Bail Condition, N. Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at A17.
232. See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW .
U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (stating that dangerousness assessments play a role in
“death penalty determinations, non-capital sentencing, sexual predator
commitment, civil commitment, pretrial detention, and investigative stops by
the police”).
233. Id. at 3.
234. See id. at 7–8. As Slobogin explains in greater detail:
First, imposition of the reasonable doubt standard [for predictive
detention] is overly stringent when the state’s goal is to prevent
rather than to punish. Second, the belief that the criminal law
permits conviction only when there is no reasonable doubt about
blameworthiness is based on a misconception about the reliability of
assessments made in criminal cases; in fact, the culpability
determinations that provide the primary basis for criminal
punishment are subject to serious inaccuracy. Third, requiring a high
degree of danger is inconsistent with the fact that many of the crimes
that penalize dangerous activity require very little in the way of
predictive validity.
Id. at 6–7.
235. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983).

JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWLANDS

1343

argument goes, if we can rely on the shaky credibility of
predictive dangerousness to justify an execution, how could it not
justify regular pretrial detention, where no life is lost?
The answer, of course, is specific to pretrial detention. First,
there is no adversarial contest in the typical pretrial detention
hearing, as there is no right to appointed counsel during bail
determination. As the vast majority of those detained without
bail are those who cannot afford counsel on their own, it is rare to
see defense counsel appear at these hearings.236 Accordingly, the
prosecutor usually presents her reasons why the indicted offender
should not be granted bail, with no response by the defense, and
the judge decides.
Second, there is a large difference between assessing future
dangerousness for a convicted offender, who is subject to
punishment of some kind, and assessing the same for someone
who has not even been subject to conviction. Taking away the
liberty of a person convicted beyond a reasonable doubt (or who
has admitted his or her guilt) is a far more acceptable matter
than imprisoning someone whose very guilt is still in doubt.
Finally, as Paul Robinson has convincingly argued, “[i]t is
impossible to punish for dangerousness.”237 This is because, in
both theory and actuality, deserved punishment can only exist in
relation to actual wrongs done, not potential or imagined future
wrongs.238 In other words, “one can restrain, contain, or
incapacitate a dangerous person, but one cannot logically punish
dangerousness.”239 Thus it is not only unfair but theoretically
unsound to punish indicted offenders with pretrial detention for
236. Although in DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, Sept. Term, 2011, 2012 WL
10853 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 3, 2012), the Maryland Court of Appeals recently
attempted to require counsel for all pretrial detainees, in April 2012 the
Maryland Legislature amended the public defender statute to remove the right
to counsel at commissioner hearings but mandated counsel at the initial judicial
bail review. See Maryland Public Defender Act, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.
§§ 16-101 to -403; see also Paul DeWolfe, Reducing Pretrial Detention in
Maryland, Audacious Ideas (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:04 AM), http://www.audacious
ideas.org/2012/04/reducing-pretrial-detention-in-maryland/ (last visited Sept.
24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
237. Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1432.
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their potential future dangerousness. Dangerousness and desert
are two very different concepts,240 and should not be conflated
together in the realm of pretrial detention.
4. Empirical Evidence and National Trends
The actual work of determining dangerousness is a chancy
business, filled with pitfalls and indeterminacy. To predict the
dangerousness of the defendant, courts tend to analyze the
nature of the charged crime and combine this information with
their knowledge of his or her past conduct.241 The court then adds
to this assessment its own determination of the accused’s
circumstances and character.242 In many states, a more subjective
judicial assessment permits courts to consider the totality of the
defendant’s circumstances and character.243 This aspect of
determining dangerousness, then, is highly influenced by the
court’s personal feelings and quirks. Despite the claim for
scientific accuracy, the determination of dangerousness is far
more based on subjectivity than objective factors.
As a whole, predicting pretrial crime is a dubious science.244
In fact, our assumptions about who might be mostly likely to
reoffend before trial are often not borne out. For example, as
demonstrated by one of the few large empirical studies done on
defendants released before their trials, those charged with violent
crimes are not necessarily more likely to be rearrested pretrial.245
240. Id. at 1438.
241. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 15, at 508–10. As Baradaran
and McIntyre show, there are five states that allow for an even deeper look into
a defendant’s background by allowing judges to factor the defendant’s past
conduct into their determination. Id. at 511.
242. See id. (noting that this factor is much broader to allow for judicial
discretion).
243. See id. at 510. As the authors note, some state statutes include a list of
factors with an “including but not limited to” clause, or permit judicial officers to
consider “any other factor” relevant to making a determination of
dangerousness. Id. at 511.
244. Id. at 523.
245. See id. at 528. As the authors point out:
The highest rearrest rates pretrial are for defendants charged with
drug sales or robbery (21%), followed by motor vehicle theft (20%),
and burglary (19%). Those released who are charged with the ‘more
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Nationally, 16% of defendants released on bail are rearrested for
any reason, and 11% are rearrested for a felony.246 Particularly
important for our purposes, only 1.9% of all defendants released
on bail before trial are rearrested for a violent felony.247 Thus, one
prong of the furor over “dangerous” indicted defendants is
blunted; if only a tiny percentage of all defendants released on
bail go on to reoffend with violent crimes, then perhaps our fear
over the danger posed by the pretrial defendant to the community
is overblown.
Moreover, this same study shows that those charged with
violent crimes are not necessarily more likely to be rearrested
pretrial.248 Critically, the research done by Baradaran and
McIntyre illustrates that although those defendants charged with
violent crimes have the highest likelihood of being rearrested on
bail, there is still huge variation in how dangerous these violent
crime defendants can be, depending on the specific crime
charged.249 Thus, simply being charged with a violent crime does
not automatically create a presumption of dangerousness as
many courts believe. Ultimately, despite the large variety of
assessments of pretrial “dangerousness,” the defendants granted
bail before trial are often far less threatening to public safety
than most people would anticipate.250
Interestingly, the greatest predictor for future pretrial crime,
dangerous or not, is the existence of past arrests.251 It is
dangerous crimes,’ such as murder, rape, and felony assault, have
much overall lower rates of pretrial rearrest at 12%, 9% and 12%
respectively.
Id.
246. See id. at 527.
247. See id.
248. See id. Granted, those charged with violent crimes are more likely to be
rearrested for violent crimes on release. See id.
249. See id. at 528. For example, those defendants charged with murder
have a 6.4% violent crime rearrest rate, one of the highest. Similarly, those
defendants charged with robbery have a 5.8% chance of rearrest for violent
crime, those defendants charged with rape at 3.2% chance of rearrest for violent
crime, and those defendants charged with assault reoffend at a rate of 2.9%. See
id. at 528–29.
250. See id. at 529.
251. See id. at 536 (“A person’s number of previous arrests is a large
predictor of future rearrest; however, whether or not that prior arrest turned
into a conviction is largely irrelevant as an additional predictor.”).
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important to note that analysis of prior convictions shows that
even defendants with multiple prior convictions are still unlikely
to be rearrested for a new violent crime while on release.252
This information can help us find a better way of predicting
“dangerousness” than our current fumbling in the dark. The
charged crime, by itself, is a poor predictor of a threat to the
community, except for the most violent ones (such as murder,
which usually is statutorily prevented from bail release in any
case). The existence of multiple past convictions for similar crime
seems to have the most predictive effect, although even those
pretrial recidivism rates are low.
Accordingly, relying on our current system of judicial and
prosecutorial decision-making regarding pretrial release—which
relies primarily on the charged crime—is not only unfair, but
largely ineffective. And considering that roughly 62% of the
overall jail population consists of pretrial detainees,253 these
decisions make a huge difference. Accordingly, if we are going to
continue to use predictions of future dangerousness to determine
the imposition of pretrial detention, as is likely, we should at
least provide courts with the best and latest empirical evidence
on the subject.
Finally, on the broadest level, post-9/11 case law has also
raised important questions about the permissible scope of all
pretrial confinement.254 Do the 9/11 detainee cases affect the law
governing other detainees, whether held in state or in federal
custody, either before or after conviction?255 At least one
prominent scholar has answered the question affirmatively,
252. See id. (finding that only 5% of all defendants have more than a 5%
chance of being rearrested on a violent felony charge when released on bail).
253. See id. at 37 (finding that in 2007, 62% of the overall jail population
consisted of pretrial detainees).
254. See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal
Courts: An Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 586
(2010) (“The 9/11 case law has prompted diverse assessments, with arguments
that the judiciary has done too much, or too little, or left unanswered important
questions about the permissible scope of executive detention and surveillance
powers.”).
255. See id. at 583. Resnik points out that “As [Henry] Monaghan noted,
these questions are at the core of the shifting conception of federal courts
jurisprudence, once preoccupied with the ‘relationship between state and federal
law’ and the sometimes ‘irritating difficulty’ of sorting between the two kinds.”
Id. at 583 n.19. These issues arise with state courts as well.
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arguing that the law created in addressing the extraordinary
detainment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay is “continuous with
judicial responses to the central challenges, faced daily, by
governments trying to maintain peace and security and, hence,
incapacitating some individuals feared likely to inflict grave
harm to the social order.”256 This is because the criminal justice
system has always had to address uncertainty about how much
harm a detainee might do, whether in the context of 9/11 or of
more familiar kinds of criminality and border regulation.257
Put another way, criminal charges range in a wide
continuum from minor crimes to terrorism. In all these cases,
however, the government “must still distinguish among and
classify detainees to justify why a particular subset is to be
confined in more restrictive conditions than others, and for longer
periods of time.”258 The crimes may differ, but the determinations
are still the same.
The six post-9/11 cases decided by the Supreme Court have
held that the Constitution requires some procedural justice for all
detainees, even those held at Guantanamo Bay.259 Applied to
pretrial detention, this conclusion signals that it is time to import
some fairness and procedural justice into the bail hearing, since it
is part of the same continuum of pretrial detention.
Integrating emerging 9/11 law with state and local laws
governing confinement is an important task. Doing so highlights,
among other things, the state’s job in addressing serious
challenges in securing safety, whether locally, nationally, or
worldwide.260 As Judith Resnik has pointed out, “[s]orting the
dangerous from the benign is a daunting task.”261 This is
particularly true because neither courts nor legislatures have
256. Id. at 584.
257. Id. at 585. As Resnik notes, “Governments regularly desire to obtain
information through intense interrogations aimed at preventing injuries and at
apprehending wrongdoers, and governments regularly detain various persons.
Courts in turn have, over the last several decades, ruled many times on the
legality of detention and of confinement conditions.” Id. at 584.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 581.
260. See id. at 587 (“[T]he state regularly faces tremendous challenges in
securing safety, at both local and global levels.”).
261. Id.
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been able to come to any sort of consensus over the years
regarding who should be detained and who may be freed.262
For example, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,263 the defendant, a
Pakistani national, was detained for almost a year in the
Metropolitan Detention Center in New York. Part of that time he
was in solitary confinement, because of a claim that his identity
papers were false.264 Iqbal was deported to Pakistan after his
period of governmental detention.265 Iqbal sued the government
for his treatment period of confinement, during which he alleged
that he was subjected to cruel and inhumane conditions.266 The
Iqbal Court held, among other things, that courts could limit
individual accountability and civil liability for the harms imposed
during detention, thereby protecting those officials who were
involved in such detention programs.267 Although Iqbal is
obviously a case that can be classified as a post-9/11 terrorism
case, its disturbing lesson resonates for all pretrial detainees, and
illustrates how the lack of proper bail procedures can extend to
defendants both high and low.
Ultimately, similar problems plague both the general
procedures of pretrial detention and the small body of 9/11 law.
This includes the existence of only a tiny batch of procedural
remedies instead of a more robust body of constitutional
constraints in response to wide-ranging complaints of abuse.268
The lax oversight, minimal supervision, and extreme deference to
governmental decisions and jailors continue to be issues for 9/11
detainees, detained aliens on immigration holds, and indicted
defendants confined in pretrial detainment. All three are held
with little procedural justice due to often nebulous fears of
dangerousness. All three types of experiences linger in the arena
of pretrial detention.

262. See id. at 588 (discussing the historical conflicts between legislature
and judiciary).
263. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (finding that “qualified
immunity . . . shields Government officials”).
264. See id. at 667.
265. See id. at 668.
266. Id.
267. Resnik, supra note 254, at 633.
268. Id. at 635.
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B. Salerno, the 1984 Act, and the Sixth Amendment
The problems with Salerno are larger than just its failure to
grapple with the concept of future dangerousness. Viewed in the
aftermath of the Court’s subsequent decisions in the ApprendiBlakely line of cases, Salerno’s decision that a court may
incarcerate a defendant on the basis of potential danger to the
community seems to contradict the spirit of the Sixth
Amendment. If, as I contend, the imposition of pretrial detention
in today’s jails is a form of punishment, then the community must
have some say in the matter. Although there have been numerous
challenges to the 1984 Bail Reform Act, none have been based on
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. Below, I detail how and
why such a challenge might be successful.
1. Salerno Did Not Close the Door
Most practitioners and scholars have concluded that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Salerno pronounced the death knell
for challenges to preventative detention. This is not entirely true.
The Salerno Court specifically noted that it was foreclosing a
facial challenge to the 1984 Bail Reform Act,269 not foreclosing all
challenges for the future: “We hold that, as against the facial
attack mounted by these respondents, the Act fully comports with
constitutional requirements.”270 As such, an as-applied challenge
to the 1984 Act is still entirely feasible.
The Salerno Court seemed to leave more than one door open
to indicate its willingness to revisit its decision upholding the
constitutionality of the 1984 Act. First, it began the analysis of
the Act with a warning that a facial challenge to a legislative act
was one of the most difficult at which to succeed, since the
challenged “must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.”271 In other words, for the
269. As the Salerno Court held, “We are unwilling to say that this
congressional determination . . . on its face violates either the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
270. Id. at 741.
271. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
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defendants to succeed in challenging the 1984 Act on facial
grounds, they would have had to prove that the Bail Reform Act
could never operate constitutionally.272 The Salerno Court even
hinted that it might be willing to find some aspect of the 1984
Bail Reform Act unconstitutional under certain circumstances,
but simply not here: “The fact that the Bail Reform Act might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.”273
Moreover, the Salerno Court carefully carved out space for
future, as-applied challenges to the Act, noting in a footnote that
they “intimate[d] no view on the validity of any aspects of the Act
that are not relevant to respondents’ case.”274 Although not
precisely an invitation to bring an as-applied challenge, the
Supreme Court certainly allowed for the future possibility.
2. Pretrial Detention as Punishment Under the 1984 BRA
Even in its rejection of the defendants’ facial challenge, the
Salerno Court carved out an exception to its holding: when
pretrial detention becomes punishment. Of course, simply
because a defendant is detained does not mean that he is being
punished.275 Traditionally, we look to legislative intent to
determine whether a restriction on liberty, like pretrial
detention, is more like punishment than like regulation.276 Unless
Congress intended on imposing punishment, whether a
restriction on liberty is classified as punitive or regulatory
depends on whether there is an alternative purpose related to the
restriction and whether this restriction seems excessive in
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 745 n.3.
275. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (“Not every disability
imposed during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional
sense.”).
276. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) (“Absent a showing of an
express intent to punish on the part of the State, that determination generally
will turn on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’” (citing Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963))).
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relation to the original goal.277 In Salerno, the Supreme Court
decided that the 1984 Act, addressed facially, had a legitimate
regulatory goal (preventing danger to the community) and that
the incidents of pretrial detention were not excessive in relation
to that regulatory goal.278
Whether the Act’s legislative intent was regulatory or not,
however, the constitutionality of the scheme is far different when
the effect of pretrial detention results in punishment. The
Salerno Court itself reserved the right to decide on the
constitutionality of a situation in which “detention in a particular
case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive,
in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.”279 This was particularly
important in this case because, as a facial challenge, Salerno only
addressed theoretical pretrial detention, not actual pretrial
detention as experienced by indicted defendants.
Much of pretrial detention, whether based on fears for
community safety or flight risk, has an effect virtually
indistinguishable from punishment. Thus, despite Salerno’s
decision facially upholding the 1984 Act, there is nothing
precluding
a
court
from
finding
pretrial
detention
unconstitutional under certain punitive circumstances.
3. Applying the Sixth Amendment to the BRA
Salerno rejected the facial challenge to the 1984 Act under
both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, but did not evaluate any
Sixth Amendment claims. As such, there is nothing prohibiting
an attack on Salerno’s defense of predictive dangerousness based
on the argument that only a jury can make factual findings that
result in the imposition of punishment on an offender.
In Salerno, the Court first tackled the Fifth Amendment
claim, in which the defendants argued that the Act violated the
substantive Due Process Clause because the pretrial detention it
authorized constituted impermissible punishment.280 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, focusing on the
277.
278.
279.
280.

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
Id. at 747 n.4.
See id. at 746 (summarizing respondents’ argument).
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regulatory nature of the Act.281 Next, the Court addressed the
Eighth Amendment argument, in which the defendants argued
that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause.282 The defendants
argued that the Excessive Bail Clause granted them a right to
bail calculated solely upon considerations of flight.283 The Salerno
Court also rejected this argument, holding that “nothing in the
text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government
consideration solely to questions of flight.”284
Salerno, however, did not address the Sixth Amendment
implications for the 1984 Act, as the defendants did not raise the
issue on appeal. Additionally, a Sixth Amendment claim at the
time of the Salerno decision, in 1986, would have been fruitless.
Now, however, after the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases, an
application of the current understanding of the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right, focusing on the community’s right to be the
arbiter of punishment, makes more sense.
Although it did not address the issue, Salerno left room for
the application of our more recent understanding of the Sixth
Amendment. First, in its discussion of the Due Process Clause
challenge, the Salerno Court noted that even the Government
had not argued that pretrial detention could be upheld if it were
punishment.285 Second, as noted above, the Court carved out an
exception for cases in which detention might become “excessively
prolonged,” thereby converting to punishment.286
In its discussion of the Eighth Amendment excessive
punishment challenge, the Salerno Court was careful to note that
its decision did not implicate the question of whether the
Excessive Bail Clause affects the legislative power to delineate
who might be eligible for bail.287 In this way, the Court left room
to determine whether and how pretrial detention can be
punishment. It is this space that I will explore through the
dimensions of the Sixth Amendment community jury trial right.
281. See id. (concluding that the detention imposed by the Act is regulatory,
not punitive).
282. See id. at 752–53 (summarizing respondents’ argument).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 746.
286. See id. at 749 n.4.
287. See id. at 754.
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C. Punishment, Community Rights, and Pretrial Detention
In Blakely v. Washington,288 the Supreme Court held that the
jury is the only body that can find facts that increase the
maximum punishment for an offender.289 Put another way,
Blakely contended that a criminal offender must have a jury, or
the local community, make the determination to impose any type
of punishment.290 Our revitalized understanding of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right applies to all aspects of our criminal
justice system, from indictment to criminal fines291 post-prison
release. In fact, our Sixth Amendment constitutional guarantees
should apply with more force to the pretrial stage, since at this
point the offender still maintains the presumption of innocence.
Yet, the spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right has yet to
be applied to the pretrial detention determination stage.
1. Future Dangerousness in Adversarial Context
When we apply the spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right to the pretrial detention hearing, many problems with our
bail procedures are illuminated. One such problem is the lack of
adversarial context when determining the future dangerousness
of an indicted offender. Since the adversarial process is crucial for
the proper community understanding and imposition of
punishment, the lack of it raises equity and possibly even
constitutional concerns.
Although the 1984 Bail Reform Act does permit a federal
indicted defendant the right to legal assistance, the right to crossexamine prosecution witnesses, and the right to testify and

288. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 296 (2004) (“Because the facts
supporting petitioner’s exceptional sentence were neither admitted by petitioner
nor found by a jury, the sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury.”).
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005) (applying
Blakely to Federal Sentencing Guidelines, making Guidelines advisory);
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296.
291. See Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (applying
Apprendi-Blakely to the imposition of criminal fines).
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present witnesses in her own defense,292 the accused does not
have a right to compulsory process.293 Indeed, evidence submitted
by the prosecutor may be submitted by proffer.294 Moreover, in
the states, the amount of disclosure required varies widely; some
districts comport with Brady requirements, and some do not.
Moreover, the lack of the right to appointed counsel at the
pretrial detention stage means that the vast majority of
defendants do not have any legal representation.295
The failure to require full disclosure of evidence by the
prosecutor at the pretrial detention stage means that indicted
defendants often cannot challenge the evidence presented by the
Government to establish the accused’s future dangerousness.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the pretrial detention
hearing does not generally require “the full panoply of adversary
safeguards,”296 the establishment of potential dangerousness by
the government is such a questionable area that perhaps this is
one aspect of the hearing that the adversary process should
apply. Especially because the standard of evidence required from
the prosecutor at this stage is relatively low—only probable
cause297—it seems only fair that the accused get a greater
disclosure of evidence when she is subject to potential detention
based on dangerousness.
More and better disclosure of prosecutorial evidence is
important to help the offender challenge the request for pretrial
detention.298 When the defense lacks knowledge of the evidence
292. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006).
293. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Due Process at the Pretrial Detention Stage—What
Will Become of the Innocent?—A Call for Pretrial Discovery Rules, 46 CRIM. L.
BULL. 452, 452 (2010).
294. Id.
295. But see DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, Sept. Term, 2011, 2012 WL
10853 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 3, 2012) (mandating appointed counsel for all
pretrial detainees).
296. Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (stating that probable cause
determination can be made using informal procedures and without an adversary
hearing).
297. See id. at 464 (stating that “the prosecutor is only required to show
probable cause that the accused has committed the offense attributed to him in
addition to proving the ground of detention: obstruction of justice or
dangerousness”).
298. See id. at 465 (“Disclosure could be of paramount importance to the
accused in contesting the evidence against him.”).
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against him, the defendant cannot properly challenge the
detention request, meaningfully participate in the hearing, or
refute any secret evidence because the proceeding is one-sided.299
This lack of adversary context and one-sided nature of the
detention hearing also implicates the spirit of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right. If, as the Apprendi-Blakely line of
cases instructs us, the community is supposed to decide all
potential punishments for an offender after observing the
adjudicatory process, and punishment is being imposed on the
offender during pretrial detention, then there should be some sort
of adversarial process during the detention hearing. Although a
full adversarial procedure would not be feasible, a detention
hearing should provide a few more procedural safeguards. At the
very least, this should include the requirement of a minimum
proffer of prosecutorial evidence at the hearing, proved by a
standard of probable cause, in any case in which the indicted
defendant might potentially be detained due to community safety
concerns. Of course, for this proffer to have meaning, defense
counsel would have to be provided for those indigent offenders at
the hearing.
2. Post-Blakely, Community as Only Arbiter of Punishment
Of even more concern to the application of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right is the belief that the community
should be the primary arbiter of punishment for all offenders.
The guarantee that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury” promises a
criminal offender that “all the facts which must exist in order to
subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be
found by the jury.”300 This interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right ultimately became law in Blakely.301
This animating principle behind Blakely—that the
community should determine all punishment to be meted out to
299. Id. at 466.
300. Apprendi v. New York, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (Scalia, J., concurring).
301. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–02 (2004) (holding that to
increase a sentence beyond the maximum suggested by the Guidelines, a jury
must find the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt).
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the defendant—has import for not just the jury trial, but for other
areas of criminal procedure too. Blakely applied first and
foremost to sentencing, but there is no reason why it should not
be applied to the pretrial detention hearing as well. This holds
particularly true after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Southern Union, holding that any punishment rendered by the
courts, including criminal fines, should have its facts determined
by a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.302 Southern Union helps
bolster the belief that Blakely is applicable to all types of criminal
procedures, from the front-end to the back-end.
Recent conditions in pretrial detention centers have rendered
any sort of time in them a form of punishment in addition to all
the negative externalities that flow from a pretrial loss of liberty.
Not only is this punishment imposed before a determination of
guilt, but it is also imposed by a judge, not a jury—a violation of
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right to determine facts relevant
to punishment for a criminal offender. The question becomes,
then, under what circumstances does the judicial determination
of pretrial detention transform into punitive measures? When
denial of bail results in an imposition of punishment, this might
mean that the community should play a role, particularly in
determinations of its own safety.
3. The Community Should Decide Danger to Itself
Considering that a very popular aspect of pretrial detention
confines indicted offenders due to an alleged threat to community
safety, it is ironic that this determination entirely lacks
community imprimatur. In many cases, members of the
community would be more familiar with who might be dangerous,
particularly when it comes to nonviolent drug crimes. In contrast,
a line prosecutor often has other concerns on his or her mind
when determining whether an indicted offender may post bail
before trial. Additionally, judges are not always part of the
communities they govern, and may be more interested in
uniformity (or in some cases, re-election) than individual justice.
Thus there may be a true need for the community voice within
302.

Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
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the bail hearing procedure. The prosecutor is both technically and
legally the public’s representative.303 The prosecutor’s function as
the people’s representative, however, can be subsumed by a
gradual inclination to align with the government and a desire to
achieve a positive win-loss record. Too often, prosecutors have
“their own agendas, both personal and administrative.”304 For
prosecutors, the concepts of public interest or justice can be too
diffuse and elastic to constrain them. A prosecutor’s simultaneous
representation of both the state and the people can get
submerged in the everyday details of doing her job, particularly
when the indicted offender is a high-profile defendant and there
is considerable media scrutiny and pressure on the case.
Allowing some slice of the community to help determine
whether the accused is truly a threat to community safety, then,
makes both logical and ethical sense. First, the community often
knows the offender far better than either the prosecutor or the
judge, especially in a state, municipal or local forum. Despite the
persistent fear of crimes perpetuated by strangers, people tend to
commit most crimes within their communities.305 As such, some
representation from the community might help make the best
determination as to whether the accused might pose a danger if
granted bail.
Additionally, granting the community some power to
determine whether pretrial detention should be imposed would
also foster a feeling of participation and investment in the
criminal justice system, something that many members of the
public lack. Being given the opportunity to make real decisions on
community safety would hopefully make these citizens, and by
association, their families and friends, feel far more connected to
how the criminal justice system works. Put another way, instead
of envisioning the criminal justice system as a faceless, remote
303. As the Supreme Court has noted, the prosecution’s interest “is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
304. Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty
Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 S.M.U. L. REV. 567, 569 (1996).
305. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some
Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State
Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 508, 516 (1995) (noting that “most crime is local
in nature, and consequently, the local community feels the brunt of the
offense”).
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entity, the local public, through their participation in the pretrial
detention hearing, would realize that they are part of the justice
system as well. This would generally promote the legitimacy and
public confidence in the justice system, something that has been
lacking of late.
Finally, having the community become involved with pretrial
detention determinations will result in the public’s increased
understanding of the criminal justice system. Particularly with
high-profile cases, the current nontransparent procedures
determining pretrial detention can create both disappointment
and a sense of helplessness in the local community. For example,
when disgraced financier Bernie Madoff was granted bail after
his confession to the police, the local and international public
were angered and dismayed.306 The public’s integration into the
pretrial detention hearing through participation in the procedure
can eliminate some of the concerns inherent in imposing pretrial
detention or granting bail by exposing the public to the actual
discussion and debate over individual bail determinations.
4. Laymen and Members of Community As Predictors of Danger
Having an informed segment of the community take part in
pretrial detention determinations will also help the accuracy of
the “future dangerousness” predictions. Currently, judges tend to
use their own intuition to determine how dangerous an indicted
offender might be, or they rely on a prosecutor’s statement of
disrupted community safety. This can result in an overprediction
of future dangerousness. Naturally a prosecutor would have an
interest in the defendant remaining in custody as long as
306. See Madoff Debate: Should He Be Free on Bail?, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 7,
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28540171/ns/business-us_business/t/mad
off-debate-should-he-be-free-bail/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (discussing how
investors, editorial writers, and the general public expressed outrage regarding
the granting of Madoff’s bail, while prosecutors argued Madoff should be thrown
behind bars because he could flee or hide his assets) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Larry Neumeister, Bernie Madoff
Escapes Jail, Judge Declines to Revoke Bail, H UFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/12/bernie-madoff-jail-hearin_n_157049.
html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (discussing how “[t]here is a thirst for blood
that transcends just those who have been victimized”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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possible, both to ensure cooperation and to make sure no further
crimes happen that might reflect negatively on the prosecutor’s
office itself. Although communities can also fall prey to
overpredicting dangerousness, in many situations, particularly
those not involving violent crime, the local public has a more
nuanced view of the potential liabilities.
Judges can have a tendency to be biased in favor of
predicting dangerousness, in part because they will be
responsible if they erroneously release a violent individual.307
Additionally, judges, like all experts who routinely make these
types of dangerousness determinations, may also have a tendency
to generalize from experiences with past offenders on bases that
have few, if any, relationships to future violence.308
Members of the community, on the other hand, lack some of
these pressures and biases. First, even if they participate in some
sort of pretrial detention hearing, they would not bear any
ultimate responsibility if the indicted offender were to commit
another crime before trial. Equally important, the small crosssection of the public that would be involved in determining
whether the accused obtained bail would not have the
aforementioned tendency to generalize from prior experiences,
allowing them to make the determination of pretrial detention
from a fresh perspective.
5. Attacking the Problems of Race & Gender in Pretrial Detention
Like the rest of the criminal justice system, the pretrial
detention procedure is rife with racial and gender-based
disparities. First, people of color are disproportionately confined
307. See J. MONAHAN, T HE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 13,
22–25 (1981) (noting that psychiatrists might be less accurate predictors of
future violence than laymen because of personal bias arising from fear of
responsibility for erroneous release of a violent person).
308. See Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some
Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224, 229–30 (1978)
(arguing that when prior probabilities of the outcome, or base rates, are very
low, the predictions are of poor reliability). Of course, one way to combat this
problem of the courts relying on intuition is to provide them with accurate
empirical studies of which offenders are most likely to offender, such as that
provided by Baradaran & McIntyre.
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in jail, whether for pretrial detention or other reasons.309 Recent
analysis has shown that both the race and gender of an offender
can have a significant effect on the likelihood of pretrial
detention.310
For example, in federal cases, an offender’s sex affected
pretrial custody for both black and white offenders; pretrial
detention was less likely for both black and white females than
for males of their respective races.311 Likewise, the likelihood of
pretrial custody was substantially higher for black male offenders
than for other offenders—twice those for white males, and over
three times more likely than for black or white females.312 The
author of the study has suggested that some of this may be due to
judicial stereotyping of black or male defendants as more
dangerous than their white or female counterparts, particularly
when dealing with drug crimes.313 Finally, Latinos are most likely
of all races to suffer the negative consequences of pretrial
detention: they are most likely to have to pay bail (as opposed to
being released on their own recognizance); courts tend to set
them the highest bail amounts; they are least likely to be able to
pay; and they are by far the least likely to be released prior to
trial.314
Although there is no guarantee that the local community or
general public would hold less prejudicial attitudes toward
309. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 4 (“Latinos are more likely
than are whites or African Americans to have to pay bail, and they have the
highest bail amounts, are least likely to be able to pay, and are by far the least
likely to be released prior to trial.”).
310. Caasia Spohn, Race, Sex and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court:
Indirect Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 879, 893
(2009). The data analyzed in this article showed that race and gender affected
pretrial detention determinations even after excluding the offender’s
dangerousness, community ties, financial resources, criminal history, and crime
seriousness. Id.
311. Id. at 891.
312. Id. at 895–96.
313. Id. at 898–99. See generally Sara Steen, Rodney L. Engen & Randy R.
Gainey, Images of Danger and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing,
and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 435 (2005) (discussing their study of
adult drug offenders in Washington and finding that those who most or least
resemble a dangerous drug offender receive harsher or more lenient
punishment, respectively).
314. PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 4.
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defendants based on race or gender, in some communities, the
presence of community members could make a difference in terms
of expanding diversity and representation. Although strides
certainly have been made to diversify the bar and the bench, the
fact remains that magistrates and trial judges are primarily
white315 and defendants are often minorities.316 In certain
districts, such as the Bronx or East Los Angeles, the presence of a
few community members would make some diversity that much
more likely.
Additionally, the presence of representatives from
historically minority communities would help make the ultimate
decision to either grant bail or impose pretrial detention more
understandable to the local public as well as explain how the
pretrial detention decision might impact the community. Because
many minority communities tend to feel alienated or distanced
from the criminal justice system, the incorporation of some public
representatives into the bail determination hearing would help
reduce some of this distance.
V. Proposal: Reform and Revision
A. Reforming Bail Bondsmen and Pretrial Release
One problem that plagues several states is the problem of
commercial bondsmen. Some states have no commercial
bondsmen at all, which results in serious problems for the poor,
who often cannot afford even the small amount comprising their
bail. Other states have bail bondsmen who do not provide loans
for small bail amounts. There are a couple of ways to solve this
problem.
First, states and counties could expand and better fund their
pretrial release programs, changing their general policy to one
that assumes the granting of bail unless there is a serious or
315.

AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES—DIVERSITY
BENCH (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/bench_diversity/index.cfm?state=.
316. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.6.0022.2011 (2011), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t600222011.pdf (stating that federal
prisons populations are composed of 56.8% white and 37.9% black prisoners).
OF
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violent crime involved. Pretrial release programs often allow
nonviolent or low-level offenders out on bail with supervision,
using GPS, ankle bracelets, and monitoring.317 Allowing indicted
offenders out on bail with the help of electronic monitoring
permits them to save their jobs, pay their bills, keep their homes
and see their families.318 This would not only prevent nonviolent
indicted offenders from suffering the dangers and indignities of
pretrial detention, but also save counties and states thousands of
dollars in incarceration costs.
However, pretrial release programs across the country are all
too often fighting a futile battle with bail bond companies trying
to either limit these types of programs or completely shut them
down.319 As one pretrial release program official notes,
commercial bail bondsmen lobby to keep these programs as
miniscule as possible, so that they do not siphon off any paying
customers, even if that means thousands of inmates wait in jail
at the taxpayers’ expense.320
Thus, one way to improve the current pretrial detention
system is to increase local and county pretrial supervision
programs in conjunction with much broader granting of bail,
combined with providing appointed counsel for all indigent
defendants in bail hearings.321 Although these services do cost
money, in the long term they end up saving far more taxpayer
dollars, as it is far more expensive to imprison those indicted
offenders waiting for trial than to supervise them electronically
at home.322

317. Laura Sullivan, Bondsman Lobby Targets Pretrial Release Programs,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=122725849 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Bondsman] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. As Yale Kamisar has long argued, the bail hearing is a critical phase,
deserving of effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR ET AL.,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 872 n.8 (8th
ed. 1994).
322. Sullivan, Bail Burden, supra note 23.
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B. Revising the Bail Hearing Procedure
Some of the ills of our criminal justice systems can be traced
to the dissociation between our local communities and their
ability to effect change on the system. Insufficient local control is
a serious issue, pervading all aspects of criminal justice. As Bill
Stuntz persuasively argued,
To the suburban voters, state legislators, and state and federal
appellate judges whose decisions shape policing and
punishment on city streets, criminal justice policies are mostly
political symbols or legal abstractions, not questions the
answers to which define neighborhood life. Decisionmakers
who neither reap the benefit of good decisions nor bear the cost
of bad ones tend to make bad ones. Those sad propositions
explain much of the inequality in American criminal justice.323

This is particularly true in pretrial detention hearings, at which
the question of whether an indicted defendant is released or not
before his trial often rests on decisions made by remote
legislators or senior district attorneys. The local community has
little or no say in the matter.
But this result is neither preordained nor necessary. One
way to get the community more involved in the criminal justice
process—thus making them feel more invested in the system—is
to invite their participation in the pretrial detention hearing,
allowing them to give their opinion on whether the suspect is a
true threat to community safety.
Having the community actually involved in determining
what would best serve community safety, and possibly being
more lenient regarding the pretrial release of indicted, low-level
offenders is not such a novel idea. Various scholars have noted in
the past ten years the social consequences of mass incarceration:
by incarcerating too many nonviolent criminals, either before or
after conviction, not only are poor and minority communities
increasingly harmed by the massive scale of incarceration, but
many of these nonviolent offenders do become dangerous after
being exposed to violent criminals in jail or prison.324 Thus, the
323. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974
(2008).
324. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence
and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6
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short-term decision to incarcerate pretrial offenders for purposes
of “community safety” ends up backfiring on a number of levels in
the long run.
However, incorporating the community into the bail hearing
would have many positive results. These positive aspects include
the public’s increased understanding of the criminal justice
system, a restoration of criminal adjudication’s educative
function, and a sense of investment and trust for the local
community.
First, and most basically, the current bail hearing process—
like so much else in the criminal justice system—functions out of
sight from the average citizen. The local public has a meaningful
interest in uncovering the procedures involved in denying or
granting bail, especially because so many taxpayer dollars are
being used to incarcerate those who have not yet been determined
guilty.
Moreover, enhancing local, popular participation within an
existing criminal justice institution,325 such as the bail hearing,
combines the positives of community involvement without
requiring new courts or immense change in the existing system.
Additionally, through citizen involvement, the “cynicism and
contempt” for the criminal justice system that is invariably
created by more secret proceedings will be minimized.326 This is
especially important for communities that have felt distanced and
isolated by the criminal justice system; by allowing these
communities to determine whether one of their own is “safe”
enough to release pretrial, the local public may feel some
investment or purchase into the workings of the system.
As Judith Resnik has powerfully argued, “[t]hird-party
scrutiny illuminates the treatment of suspects, detainees,
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 201–05 (2008) (discussing the social consequences of
mass incarceration); James Forman, Jr., Book Review, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993,
999 (2010) (reviewing PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF
JUSTICE (2009)).
325. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 359, 363 (2005) (“The best way to introduce the community justice
goal of greater citizen input into the administration of justice is not to scale up
current community justice programs, but to provide for enhanced local, popular
participation within existing criminal justice institutions.”).
326. Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining, A Critic’s Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 555, 557 (1979).
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prisoners, and immigrants, all reliant on government for their
well-being.”327 Allowing the community to observe and participate
in the routine preventative detention hearing of a domestic
defendant, then, would vindicate a number of rights, including, of
course, the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right. Resnik has made
a similar suggestion concerning the imposition of detention on
various detainees or prisoners, proposing a more audience role for
the public.328 Her comment, however, applies equally to both her
proposal and mine: “[L]aw ought to oblige open decision making
when confinement is at stake.”329
Moreover, allowing a cross-section of the community to make
decisions on questions of “dangerousness” along with the court
would provide a less jaded sensibility to the pretrial detention
determination. Although normally we defer to courts to make
such decisions, having fresh eyes look at each individual
situation, from a body that is not beholden to re-election or reappointment processes, would inject both transparency and
fairness into the proceedings. A bail jury, in other words, could
make decisions informed by their own knowledge of the
community and unburdened by judicial pressures and biases,
providing a different view that could be added to the court’s
determination to provide the fullest range of opinion before
decision-making.
This kind of open decision making—and open participation
by the local public—is most likely to take place in the state court
system, which processes a vast percentage of pretrial detainees in
the country. As Resnik notes, “[t]he last few decades have
brought attention to state courts as a font of constitutional
327. Resnik, supra note 254, at 670. Although Resnik is primarily
envisioning courts as this public oversight, she admits to a possible role for
other third parties. As she notes, speaking of the general public’s right of
audience during these impositions of detention, “[e]mpowered, participatory
audiences can therefore see and then debate what legal parameters ought to
govern.” Id.
328. Id. at 671. As Resnik argues, “law could require that some members of
the public (subject to appropriate security screening) be permitted to observe
decisions resulting in the long-term detention of persons, whether alleged to be
terrorists, illicit migrants, or misbehaving prisoners.” Id.
329. Id. This is particularly true when, as now, the Court has “repeatedly
insulated the federal judiciary from addressing the merits to decide when an
individual is wrongfully convicted or detained in intolerable conditions.” Id. at
681.
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jurisprudence that can be more rights-protective than federal
precepts.”330 Because of this, it would be easy enough to draw
from the county jury rolls to create a body of local fact finders for
bail hearings, who would be selected in a manner similar to those
citizens selected for the grand jury.
These “bail juries” could sit for a week or two at a time,
focusing their decisions on the community safety issue; in other
words, whether the indicted defendants brought before the court
would be eligible for bail. If the “bail jury” deemed the defendant
safe for release out into the community, perhaps using a
preponderance of the evidence standard,331 and the court had no
substantive objection, then barring any true evidence of danger to
the public, he or she would be released either on their own
recognizance or electronically monitored until trial or guilty plea
date. If the bail jury’s determination differed from the judge’s,
then the court could call for more information from both sides to
further illuminate the issue, until an agreement is reached.
C. Potential Problems
The major possible critiques of a bail jury are two-fold. First
is one of history: the question of bail has always been left to the
court, and not the community. Second is the cluster of concerns
centering around the implementation of a bail jury, its potential
costs, complexity, and delay. I address both these concerns below.
1. Lack of Historical Precedent
Since the practice of granting bail began, the traditional
arbiter of detention or release has been the court. However, as
discussed infra Part II, the decision of whether to detain a
defendant pending trial was always left to the community—
literally, as a friend or neighbor had to stand surety for the
defendant and house him or her in their own residence.332 The
various rules that developed regarding bail were, as noted above,
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 682.
Thanks to Dan Markel for flagging this issue.
See infra Part II.A.
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aimed more at limiting judicial discretion than anything else—
always a concern in both seventeenth-century England and
colonial America. Thus even in the earliest of bail systems, the
community’s voice was heard.
Additionally, pretrial detention as originally configured was
based only on risk of flight. There was no incarceration, at a
neighbor’s house or in a local jail, ever predicated on future
dangerousness, or community safety. Thus, there is no historical
precedent limiting the bail decision solely to the judge. On the
contrary, returning some power to the community would be a
return to the original bail granting practice, upon which our
Constitution is based.
Moreover, the use of a bail jury meshes neatly with the
recent interest in local control over local environments.333 Various
advocates of localism argue that “local governments are more
responsive to the specific needs of unique communities and that
local institutions can provide better and increased services.”334
These arguments parallel the one that can be made for the bail
jury—that the local input is critical in implementing our criminal
justice system, particularly for issues of community safety.
2. Impracticality/Cost/Delays
A second, potentially more serious, critique of the bail jury is
its impracticality, both in terms of cost and delay. In these
fiscally stringent times, any procedure that would add to the cost
structure of the criminal justice process is viewed dubiously at
best. And incorporating a bail jury into the pretrial detention
hearing would potentially increase costs; although the bail jury
could be drawn from the same rolls as the grand jury, the more
citizens drawn, the more money needed to fund per diems,
reimburse transportation costs, and pay court staff to organize
such juries.
333. See Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV.
371, 380 (2001) (finding an “increasing insistence on and institutionalization of
local control over local environment”). Schragger points out that this new
localism has arisen as a response to urban disorder and the problems of urban
governance. Id.
334. See id. at 381.
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As noted above, however, the potential amount of savings
that a properly working bail jury would provide could be vast.
Even a thirty percent reduction in those incarcerated before trial
could save the state thousands of dollars. And while there are no
guarantees that a bail jury would be more lenient on matters of
pretrial release than the traditional judicial arbiter, it is likely
that a more informed body of decision makers—i.e., a crosssection of the community—might not believe that every indicted
offender is a threat to public safety.
As for delays, it is possible that the incorporation of the bail
jury would slow down the pretrial detention somewhat. But that
is not necessarily a bad thing. Part of the problem with our
current bail hearings is the speed at which these critical
determinations happen. Since there is no right to appointed
counsel at a bail hearing, often they are very fast, as the
prosecutor presents evidence regarding defendant’s incarceration
and the court makes a decision. Reducing the haste of the process
might also ensure that both the court and the prosecutor take the
process more seriously; since the bail jury will not be criminal
justice insiders, they will likely focus on each individual case
more intensely, and require the prosecutor to more fully explain
her reasoning for denying bail. The court, too, may spend more
time on the decision, as it will need to incorporate the bail jury’s
decision into its own. Thus, the delay in imposing pretrial
detention or granting bail might be a positive one, opening up the
procedure to some much needed sunshine and scrutiny.
Although the bail jury does not tidily solve all of the
problems of our framework of bail and jail, it provides a partial
solution to some of the glaring inequities of pretrial detention.
VI. Conclusion
Reform is desperately needed in the realm of pretrial
detention to remove it from the Shadowlands of justice. As Resnik
has persuasively argued, in protecting and preserving rights,
“Article III judges—the exemplars of independent jurists—can
never be enough.”335 This is equally true for state court judges
335. Resnik, supra note 254, at 685. As Resnik argues, “[a]s the
constitutional law of detention makes painfully clear, if American law is to
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and magistrates, many of whom are at the mercy of re-election
cycles, overwhelming caseloads, and restrictive statutes.
Although there is no one perfect solution, the use of a bail
jury, combined with increasing monitored pretrial release, would
begin to solve both constitutional and procedural problems. First,
the bail jury would help ameliorate the Sixth Amendment issue,
allowing the community a chance to help decide any pretrial
punishment imposed on indicted offenders. Additionally, giving
local citizens a say in who is released back into their community
has a practical aspect to it; instead of having the prosecutor and
the judge, both representatives of the government, be the only
ones to determine community safety, it makes sense to have some
input from the very community that the government is trying to
protect. Second, the addition of increased electronic monitoring of
those offenders released before trial would be a relatively easy,
cost-effective way to permit those accused who either cannot
afford to make bail or about whom the community or judge still
have some reservations to escape remaining in jail until their
trial.
As both a practical measure and a fundamental matter of
constitutional fidelity, the people should be involved in the
machinations of criminal punishment. This includes the
procedures that happen before trial. Our current system of
pretrial detention lies in shambles, incarcerating those not yet
convicted in punitive conditions often far worse than those
existing in prisons. Allowing the community a say in the matter
and broadening the ambit of those who can be released pretrial is
one way to shine light into the darkness.

cherish human dignity, it will be because more than life-tenured judges make it
do so.” Id.

